Jurisdictional Immunities of the State and Exequatur of Foreign Judgments: a private International Law Evaluation of the Recent ICJ Judgment in Germany v. Italy by Boschiero, Nerina
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 38/2012 
10 dicembre 2012                                                                                                   ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
Nerina Boschiero 
(ordinario di Diritto internazionale nell’Università degli Studi di Milano, 
Dipartimento di Diritto pubblico Italiano e Sovranazionale) 
 
 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State and Exequatur of Foreign 
Judgments: a private International Law Evaluation of the Recent 
ICJ Judgment in Germany v. Italy1 
 
 
SUMMARY: - 1. Introduction - 1.1. Historical and factual background of the ICJ’s 
decision in relation to proceedings involving Greek nationals - 2. The arguments of the 
Court on the private international law issue of jurisdictional immunity in exequatur 
proceedings - 2.1. Evaluation of the Court’s reasoning: its correctness and weakness in 
the light of the preliminary unconvincing solution given in respect to the violation of 
Germany’s jurisdictional immunity in proceedings brought before the Italian courts 
by Italian claimants - 2.2. The external private international law context of the ICJ’s 
judgment: the ECJ’s Lechouritou judgment - 2.3. The problematic role of secondary 
European legislation (in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters) on human 
rights claims against a State - 3. The negative impact of the ICJ’s decision on the role of 
the national/international public order exception; critical assessment of the formalistic 
“procedure/substance” distinction with regard to criminal and civil proceedings - 3.1 
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1 - Introduction 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter: Germany) instituted, in 
December 2008, proceedings against the Italian Republic (hereinafter: 
Italy) before the International Court of Justice requesting the Court to 
adjudge and declare that Italy has failed to respect the jurisdictional 
immunity that Germany enjoys under international law, in three different 
ways: 1) by allowing, before the Italian courts, several civil claims against 
Germany seeking reparation for injuries caused by violations of 
international humanitarian law committed by the German Reich during 
World War II against Italian nationals in Italy and elsewhere in Europe; (2) 
by taking measures of constraint against a German State property (Villa 
Vigoni) used for government non-commercial purposes; and 3) by 
                                                 
1 The article, accepted by the Director, is forthcoming in N. Boschiero, T. Scovazzi, C. 
Ragni, C. Pitea (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law, Essays In 
Honour of Tullio Treves, T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2013. 
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declaring enforceable in Italy certain Greek judgments against Germany 
awarding compensation for civil damages to the successors of Greek 
nationals who had been victims of a massacre in the Greek village of 
Distomo committed by German units during their withdrawal in 1944. On 
February 3, 2012 the ICJ issued a judgment totally in favour of Germany, 
having rejected all the Italian arguments in favour of the existence of an 
exception to State sovereign immunity in civil cases based on the most 
serious violations of rules of international law of a peremptory character 
(war crimes and crimes against humanity) for which no alternative means 
of redress is available2. 
Despite the truly public international law nature of the claim 
submitted to the Court (jurisdictional immunity and immunity from 
enforcement), originating in “violations of obligations under international 
law” allegedly committed by Italy through its judicial practice, the subject-
matter of the dispute also involved a typical “private international law” 
issue, namely the process of enforcing a foreign judgment (the claim 
against Italy regarding the recognition and enforcement of the decisions of 
Greek courts upholding civil claims against Germany). The Court decided 
(by a majority of fourteen to one) that the Italian courts had violated 
Germany’s immunity from jurisdiction in upholding a “request for 
exequatur” of judgments rendered by these foreign courts. Thus, the 
enforcement of foreign judgments is expressly recognized by the World 
Court as another topic at the crossroads of public and private international 
law convergence and their relationship, which challenges the sharp 
distinction between the law applicable to the rights and obligations of 
States with respect to other subjects of international law and individuals 
(public international law) and issues of jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments before national courts (private 
international law)3, whose other point of interest also derives from its 
location at the intersection of the fundamental procedure/substance 
distinction drawn by the Court4. This paper will focus precisely on 
Germany’s third submission and the crucial pronouncements of the Court 
on the question of the purpose of exequatur proceedings and their relation 
                                                 
2 ICJ: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany. Italy: Greece Intervening), 
Judgment (3 February 2012). 
3 Mills A., The Confluence of Public and Private International law, Justice, Pluralism 
and Subsidiary in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, Cambridge, 
2009. 
4 Kerameus K.D., Enforcement in the International Context, in RCADI, t. 264, 1997, 
198. 
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with the jurisdictional immunity of States: the ICJ’s judgment might in fact 
have consequences also on the private international law level: particularly, 
it could have a potential “chilling effect”5 on the fundamental role of PIL’s 
rules in preventing or remedying a denial of justice which affects 
procedural as well as substantive fundamental human rights, as well as on 
its role, maybe not so fundamental, but still very important, in supporting 
the evolving nature of customary international law6.  
 
 
1.1 - Historical and factual background of the ICJ’s decision in relation 
to proceedings involving Greek nationals 
 
The historical and factual background of the case are well known. In the 
last decade Germany has faced a growing numbers of disputes before 
Italian and Greek courts. Various claimants, who suffered injury during 
World War II, have instituted proceedings seeking financial compensation 
for that harm; Germany, in its Application to the International Court of 
Justice7, distinguished three main groups: 1) claimants (civilians) who 
were arrested on Italian soil and sent to Germany to be used as forced 
labour; 2) members of the Italian armed forces who, after the events of 
September 1943 (when, after the fall of Mussolini, Italy joined the Allied 
Powers and declared war on Germany), were taken prisoner by German 
forces, deported to German territory and German-occupied territories to 
be used as forced labour, and soon thereafter “factually” deprived by the 
Nazi authorities of their status as prisoners of war; 3) victims of massacres 
perpetrated by German forces during the last months of World War II 
during the German occupation of Italian territory. Cases involving Greek 
nationals have been considered by Germany in its Application as a “fourth 
group of disputes” to be mentioned separately as these disputes were 
raised from the attempts by Greek nationals to enforce in Italy a judgment 
obtained in Greece on account of a similar massacre committed by 
                                                 
5 Webb P., The International Court of Justice’s Judgment in Germany v. Italy: A 
Chilling Effect?, March 17, 2012, http://ilawyerblog.com/the-international-court-of-justices-
judgment-in-germany-v-italy-a-chilling-effect/ . On the role played by the ICJ in the 
development of private international law, see De Dycker S., Private International Law 
Disputes before the International Court of Justice, Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement, vol.1, No.2 (2010) 475.498; Tams C. J., Tzanakopoulos A., Barcelona Traction 
at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development, Leiden Journal of International Law, 23 
(2010). 781-800. 
6 See for a conclusion on these aspects that which is considered in section 4.  
7 Application of the Federal Republic of Germany, December 2008. 
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German military units during their withdrawal in 1944 (Distomo case)8. 
Actually, this distinction only makes sense with respect to Germany’s 
third submission against Italy, in which it complained that its 
jurisdictional immunity had also been violated by the Italian court’s 
decision to declare enforceable in Italy the Greek judgments against 
Germany in proceedings arising out of the Distomo massacre. In the 
country of origin of these judgments (the Hellenic Republic, hereinafter: 
Greece), the said proceedings found the same cause of action 
(infringements of human rights and international humanitarian law 
during belligerent occupation) invoked by the Italian victims of massacres 
committed by the German forces on the forum soil. The Distomo massacre 
was in fact one of the worst crimes, involving many civilians, committed 
by German armed forces in Greece in June 1944, during its occupation9.  
In 1995, over 250 plaintiffs brought an action for a declaratory 
judgment before the Greek Court of First Instance of Livadia, claiming 
compensation for loss of life and property due to acts perpetrated by the 
German occupation forces in Greece. Two years later (in 1997) the First 
Instance Court, by means of a “default” judgment against Germany, held 
this State liable and ordered it to pay compensation to the relatives of the 
victims (approximately $ 30 million)10. Against this judgment, Germany 
instituted proceedings before the Supreme Court of Greece (Areios Pagos), 
claiming immunity from the jurisdiction of Greek courts. On 4 May 2000 
the Supreme Court confirmed the judgment, stating (by seven votes to 
four) that the Greek courts were competent to exercise jurisdiction over 
the case.11 After the Greek Supreme Court’s pronouncement, the Greek 
Court of First Instance judgment became final, but the efforts to enforce it 
in Greece failed because the Minister of Justice denied his approval, which 
                                                 
8 Application, para. 10. 
9 Finke J., Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, Eur. J. Int. Law 
(2010) 21 (4), 855, footnote 8, which refers, for a description of the massacre, to Mazower 
M., Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44, Yale Univ. Press, 1995, 
213-215. 
10 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Court of 1st Instance of 
Levadia, Case 137/1997 (October 30, 1997); an English translation of the judgment is 
reproduced in 50 Revue Hellenique de Droit International (1997), 595, at 599 ff (with note 
by Gavouneli M., War Reparation Claims and State Immunity). See also Bantekas I.., Case 
Report: Prefecture of Voioita v. Federal Republic of Germany, 92 AJIL (1998) 765. 
11 Hellenic Supreme Court (Areios Pagos), Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, Case No.11/2000, 4 May 2000, 129 ILR (2007) 513; for a comment see 
Gavouneli M., Bantekas I., Case Report: Prefecture of Voioita v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, 95 AJIL (2001) 198.  
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was necessary, according to Article 923 of the Greek Code of Civil 
Procedure, to start enforcement proceedings against a foreign State. The 
applicants then sought to enforce the judgments of the Greek courts in 
Italy, as the Italian courts, after the landmark judgment of the Italian Court 
of Cassation of 11 March 2004, in the Ferrini case12, have reputedly 
disregarded the jurisdictional immunity of Germany13. The Court of 
Appeal of Florence held, in May 2005, that the Greek order contained in 
the judgment of the Hellenic Supreme Court imposing an obligation on 
Germany to reimburse legal expenses for the judicial proceedings before 
that Court was enforceable in Italy14. In a decision, dated 7 February 2007, 
the same Court rejected the objections raised by Germany against its 
decision of May 200515, and the Italian Court of Cassation confirmed, in a 
judgment dated 6 March 2008, the Court of Appeal of Florence’s ruling16. 
Concerning the question of reparation to be paid to Greek claimants by 
Germany, the same Court of Appeal of Florence declared, by a decision 
dated 13 June 2006, that the 1997 judgment of the Court of First Instance of 
Livadia was equally enforceable in Italy and rejected, in a judgment dated 
21 October 2008, the objections by Germany against the 2006 judgment. 
Again, the Italian Court of Cassation confirmed, by a judgment dated 12 
January 2011, the ruling of the Court of Appeal17.  
                                                 
12 Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, decision No. 5044/2004, RDI (2004) 539; ILR 
Vol. 128, 658; see Bianchi A., Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany. Italian Court of 
Cassation, March 11, 2004, 99 AJIL (2005) 242; Gattini A., War Crimes and State Immunity 
in the Ferrini Decision, 3 J Int’l Criminal Justice (2005) 224; Focarelli C., Denying Foreign 
State Immunity for Commission of International Crimes – The Ferrini Decision, 54 ICLQ 
(2005) 951; De Sena P. and De Vittor F., State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian 
Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case, (2005) 16 EJIL 89; Gianelli A., Crimini 
internazionali ed immunità degli Stati dalla giurisdizione nella sentenza Ferrini, (2004) 87 
Rivista di diritto internazionale 643; Baratta R., L'esercizio della giurisdizione civile sullo 
Stato straniero autore di crimine di Guerra, (2004) 54 Giustizia civile, 1200; Iovane M., 
The Ferrini Judgment of the Italian Supreme Court: Opening Up Domestic Courts to 
Claims of Reparation for Victims of Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights, 
(2004) 14 Italian Ybk of Intl L, 165; Ronzitti N., Un cambio di orientamento della 
Cassazione che favorisce i risarcimenti delle vittime, (2004) 14 Guida al Diritto, 38; 
Ronzitti N., Azioni belliche e risarcimento del danno, (2002), Rivista di diritto 
internazionale, 682. 
13 Judgment, paras. 27-29. 
14 Judgment, para. 33. 
15 Appello Firenze, 22 March 2007, Foro it., 2008, I, 1308 
16 Court of Cassation, S.U., 29 may 2008, No. 14199, RDI, 2009, 594, with a note by 
Bordini M., L’ordine pubblico Internazionale nella sentenza della Cassazione sulla 
decisione greca relative al caso Distomo, 497 ff. 
17 Court of Cassation, sez.1, 20 may 2011, n. 11163, RDIPP, 2010, 391 ff. 
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In 2011 Greece filed an Application at the Court’s Registry for 
permission to intervene in the case18, and it was authorized by an order of 
the Court of July 2011 to intervene in the case “as a non-party”, in so far as 
its intervention was limited to the decisions of the Greek courts which 
were declared, by the Italian courts, to be enforceable in Italy19. 
 
 
2 – The arguments of the Court on the private international law issue of 
jurisdictional immunity in exequatur proceedings 
 
In its third submission, Germany contended that its jurisdictional 
immunity had also been violated by the Italian decisions to enforce in the 
Italian forum the Greek judgments against Germany in proceedings arising 
out of the above-mentioned Distomo massacre, for the same reasons as 
those invoked by Germany in relation to the Italian proceeding instituted 
in Italy and concerning war crimes committed in Italy between 1943 and 
1945. All these civil claims, according to Germany, would have to be 
dismissed by Italy as the Italian courts were obliged to accord Germany 
jurisdictional immunity in respect of acts jure imperii performed by the 
Authorities of the Third Reich. Similarly, the decisions of the Greek court 
had also themselves been rendered in violation of its jurisdictional 
immunity.  
Before assessing the Court’s decision on Germany’s contention that 
its jurisdictional immunity had also been violated by the Italian decisions, 
it is worth remembering that exequatur is a concept which is specific to 
private international law and which refers to a specific procedure by 
which a national court authorizes the enforcement of a foreign judgment 
in its country20. The enforcement of a foreign judgment consists of 
securing compliance therewith, if necessary by means of coercion as 
allowed by the law, including the intervention of the forces of law and 
order (it could take, for instance, the form of an attachment of the debtor’s 
                                                 
18 Tzanakopoulos A., The Distomo Case: Greece to Intervene in the Sovereign 
Immunity Dispute between Germany and Italay before the ICJ, January 17, 2011, EJIL 
Analysis, EJIL Reports. 
19 Judgment, para. 10. For different conclusions on the point of Greece’s legal interest 
relating to the enforcement of its judicial decisions abroad, see Additional Observations 
of Germany on Whether to Grant the Application for Permission to Intervene Filed by 
Greece, paras. 5-6; Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade; Declaration of Judge ad 
Hoc Gaja. 
20 See, European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial matter , Glossary, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/glossary/. 
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assets). In principle, enforceability is confined to the State of the court 
which gave the judgment; to be enforceable abroad, the judgment must be 
declared enforceable (by the exequatur procedure) or be registered (like in 
the UK and in Ireland). The enforcement of a foreign judgment 
nevertheless requires a preliminary step: there can be no enforcement 
without recognition; recognition has the fundamental function of 
rendering the foreign judgment res judicata in the forum, conferring on it 
the authority and effectiveness accorded in the State in which it was given. 
Only after recognition, is the judgment a valid title for execution. It is 
obviously possible for the creditor to have a foreign judgment only 
recognized, in order to prevent proceedings being pursued before a 
domestic court of the forum, without any prospect of 
enforcement/execution.  
The distinction between mere recognition and enforcement in the 
strict sense of the term in relation to State immunity has been the object of 
divergence between French courts confronted with an application to 
recognize an award rendered under the auspices of the ICSID: Articles 53 
and 54 of the relevant Convention require each Contracting State to 
recognize an ICSID award simply upon the production of a copy of the 
award. The ICSID Award in SOABI v. Senegal21 had been granted an 
exequatur by the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris. Senegal appealed 
against it before the Court of Appeals of Paris which set aside the order of 
exequatur as being contrary to “international public policy” (ordre public): 
according to the Court of Appeals, the State of Senegal had not waived its 
right to invoke its immunity from enforcement in a Contracting State 
under Article 55 of the Convention, and the applicant/creditor had not 
demonstrated that enforcement would be carried out against commercial 
property, in such a way as not to conflict with Senegal’s the immunity 
from execution22. This judgment was reversed by the Cour de Cassation, 
with the reasoning that an exequatur did not constitute a measure of 
enforcement which, as such, could give rise to immunity from execution 
for the State concerned23. Thus, for the purpose of State immunity enjoyed 
by States, according to the French Cour de Cassation a distinction is to be 
made between exequatur (the procedure on the basis of which judgments 
are recognized and also declared enforceable in the State addressed) and 
                                                 
21 SOABI v. Senegal, Award, 25 February 1988, 2 ICSID Reports, 383-389. 
22 Cour d’appel, Paris, 5 Décembre 1989,117 Journal du Droit International 141 (1990). 
23 Cour de cassation, 11 June 1991, 118 Journal du Droit International 1005 (1991). 
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“enforcement” in the strict sense, i.e. effective enforcement measures 
against property belonging to it, situated in a foreign territory24.  
This is the same distinction which was also made by the ICJ in 
relation to Germany’s third submission against Italy: after having 
determined, in respect of Germany’s second submission, that the Italian 
measures of constraint against Villa Vigoni (a German-Italian centre for 
cultural encounters, located near Lake Como) constituted a violation by 
Italy of its obligations to respect Germany’s immunity from enforcement25, 
the Court stated that Germany’s third submission is an entirely separate 
and distinct issue from that set out in the preceding one. In being asked to 
decide whether the Italian judgments declaring the Greek decisions to be 
enforceable in Italy “themselves” constituted a violation of Germany’s 
immunity, independent of any act of execution/enforcement, the Court 
was no longer concerned with immunity from enforcement. 
Notwithstanding the obvious link between the two aspects of the 
procedure, since the measures of constraint against Villa Vigoni “could 
only have been imposed on the basis of the judgment of the Florence 
Court of Appeal according exequatur in respect of the judgment of the 
Greek court in Livadia”26, the Court declared that the two issues remain 
“clearly distinct”. In its view, the exequatur proceedings by which foreign 
judgments are given res judicata effects and force éxecutoire, i.e. declared 
enforceable, address another form of immunity governed by a different set 
of rules, precisely “immunity from jurisdiction”.  
A possible explanation for the different approach taken by the 
French Court of Cassation concerning the relevance of immunity in 
exequatur proceedings is that all States parties to the ICSID Convention are 
under an obligation to recognize and enforce ICSID awards as if they were 
                                                 
24 This distinction has also been endorsed by Italian doctrine commenting on the 
Court of Cassation’s judgment which confirmed the exequatur to the Greek decision on 
the Distomo massacre: see Franzina P. Norme sull’efficacia delle decisioni straniere e 
immunità degli Stati dalla giurisdizione civile, in caso di violazioni gravi dei diritti 
dell’uomo, DUDI, vol. 2, n. 3, 2008. 
25 First, Germany had not waived its immunity from enforcement as regards property 
belonging to it situated in Italy; secondly, the property which was the subject of the legal 
charge (ipoteca gudiziale) was being used for governmental purposes, hence within 
Germany’s sovereign functions. It is worth noting that Italy did not seek to justify this 
specific measure of constraint; on the contrary, it indicated to the Court that it “has no 
objection to any at the land registry is cancelled”, see Judgment, para. 110. 
25 Judgement decision by the Court obliging Italy to ensure that the mortgage on Villa 
Vigoni inscribed at the land registry is cancelled”, see Judgment, para. 110. 
26 Judgement, para. 124. 
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final judgments of local courts; therefore, the Contracting States which 
have consented to arbitration have thereby “agreed that the award may be 
granted exequatur”27: under the ICSID Convention, only “enforcement” 
has its limitation in State immunity, as Article 55, which preserves State 
immunity from execution, neither applies to immunity from jurisdiction, 
nor to proceedings for the recognition of an award.28 In any case, the 
relationship between arbitration law and the law of State immunity poses 
particular and peculiar challenges29, extraneous to the traditional doctrine 
of State immunity: what was as at stake in Germany’s third submission 
before the ICJ was precisely the scope and the extent of the customary 
international law governing the jurisdictional immunity of States 
(understood strictu sensu as the right of a State not to be the subject of 
judicial proceedings in the courts of another State). 
While the issue of the jurisdictional immunity of foreign States 
immediately arises when a national court is asked to rule “on the merits” 
of a claim brought against a foreign State, difficulties arise when the same 
court is simply asked to recognize and enforce a decision already rendered 
by a foreign court against a third State “which is deemed to have itself 
examined and applied the rules governing the jurisdictional immunity of 
the respondent State”30. By stating this, the ICJ referred to one condition 
(among a number of common conditions) under which, according to 
various national legal regimes, a foreign judgment is entitled to 
                                                 
27 Cour de cassation, 11 June 1991, cit. 
28 UNCTAD, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2.9. 
Binding Force and Enforcement, 2003, 18. 
29 In its decision rendered on June 6, 2000 in Creighton v. Qatar (Cass. 1e civ., July 6, 
2000, Creighton v. Ministère des Finances de l’Etat du Qatar, 127 J.D.I. 1054, 1055 (2000) 
(note by I. Pingel-Lenuzza); JCP, Ed. G., Pt. II, No. 10512, at 764 (2001) (note by C. Kaplan 
and G. Cuniberti)), the French Cour de cassation held that: “The obligation entered into by 
the State by signing the arbitration agreement to carry out the award according to Article 
24 of the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules [now Article 28(6) of the 
Rules in force as of January 1, 1998] implies a waiver of the State’s immunity from 
execution.” The principle that an arbitral award against a State that has given its consent 
to submit certain disputes to arbitration should not be rendered ineffective simply 
because the State benefits from immunity from execution (see Gaillard E., Younan J. 
(eds.), State Entities in International Arbitration, IAI Series on International Arbitration 
No. 4, Juris Publishing, 2008, 179-192), has been recently contradicted by a decision of the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Democratic Republic of Congo v FG Hemisphere 
Associates LLC (FACV Nos. 5, 6 & 7 of 2010 (“Congo”)), in which the Court held that no 
state may be sued in Hong Kong's courts unless the state waives its immunity, and that 
submitting to arbitration does not constitute a waiver. 
30 Judgment, para. 125. 
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recognition and enforcement: what is required is that the court of origin 
must have had jurisdiction (“indirect jurisdiction”). Most national legal 
regimes assess whether the foreign court was entitled to assume 
jurisdiction not according to foreign law (as one State’s rules of 
jurisdiction are not binding on other States), but with respect to their own 
rules of private international law. This is, for example, the case with the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Italy, governed by 
Article 64 et seq. of the Private International Law Act (Law 218 of May 31 
1995), which replaced, when it came into force (on December 31 1996), the 
provisions of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. In order for a foreign 
judgment to be recognized, Article 64 (among seven conditions which 
must be satisfied) requires that “The judge who issued the judgment must 
have had jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the relevant 
Italian principles” (part a). The same is also true for the German-Greek 
Treaty on the Mutual Recognition and Execution of Court Judgments, 
Settlements and Public Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters of 4 
November 1961, as well as for the ZPO – the German Code of Civil 
Procedure dealing with the recognition of foreign judgments: both require 
for a Greek judgment to be recognized and enforced in Germany that the 
original (Greek) court had jurisdiction on the merits of the claim according 
to Germany’s own jurisdiction rules. 
Nevertheless, the ICJ immediately rejected the “private 
international law” reasoning argued by both Parties, according to which 
the solution to the question of jurisdictional immunity in relation to 
exequatur proceedings simply depends on whether that immunity had 
been respected by the foreign court having rendered the judgment on the 
merits against the third State. It is worth remembering that, according to 
their private international law rules, the Italian and the German courts had 
arrived at opposite conclusions on the question whether the Greek courts, 
in the Distomo case, had themselves violated Germany’s immunity: in 2003 
the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH – Federal Court of Justice) declined to give 
effect to the Greek judgment in the Distomo case, on the ground that the 
Greek court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. According to the 
principle of sovereign immunity recognized by customary international 
law, which is part of German law, the Federal Court affirmed that a State 
can claim immunity from another State’s jurisdiction in respect of acta jure 
imperii. To the extent that the acts committed by German armed forces in 
Greece were undoubtedly the exercise of a sovereign power, albeit illegal 
(just as those committed on Italian soil, a point never contested by 
Germany), the BGH ruled that the Greek courts had no fundamental 
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requirement of jurisdiction to hear the case. Accordingly, the Greek 
decision was not recognized by the German courts, being in contrast to the 
international public order exception due to the reason that it had been 
rendered in breach of Germany’s entitlement to immunity31. The Italian 
courts, on the contrary, while recognizing that the actions carried out by 
Germany (on which the Italian and Greek claims were based) were 
undoubtedly an expression of its sovereign power, being conducted 
during war operations, contested that immunity from jurisdiction can be 
granted in the case of such conduct which constitutes (on the basis of 
customary international law) an international crime in that it violates 
universal values that transcend the interests of individual states. 
According to the Italian courts, respect for inviolable human rights has by 
now attained the status of a fundamental principle of the international 
legal system, and the emergence of this principle cannot but influence the 
scope of other principles that traditionally inform this legal system, 
particularly that of the “sovereign equality” of States, which constitutes 
the rationale for the recognition of state immunity from foreign civil 
jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the Italian courts, the distinction 
between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis carries no weight in relation 
to claims for compensation deriving from cases concerning torts of 
particular seriousness, in the light of the priority importance that is now 
attributed to the protection of basic human rights over the interests of the 
State in securing recognition for its own immunity from foreign 
jurisdiction32.  
In its counter-memorial, dated 22 December 2009, Italy argued that 
the Italian judges “did not commit an unlawful act since lifting Germany’s 
immunity was the only appropriate and proportionate remedy to the 
ongoing violation by Germany of its obligations to offer effective 
reparation to Italian war crimes victims. Such a measure was adopted only 
after several attempts by the victims to institute proceedings in Germany 
and it was the only possible means to ensure respect for and the 
implementation of the imperative reparation regime established for 
                                                 
31 BGH, Greek citizens v. Federal Republic of Germany, case no. III ZR 245/98, NJW, 
2003, 3488-3489, ILR, 129, 556; See, Pittrof S., Compensation Claim for Human Rights 
breaches Committed by German Armed Forces Abroad during the Second World War: 
Federal Constitutional Court hands Down Decisions in the Distomo Case, 5 German Law 
Journal (2004), 15. 
32 Court of Cassation, Ferrini v Germany, Appeal decision, no. 5044/4; ILDC 19 (IT 
2004) 11 March 2004. For an account of the most recent Italian judicial practice concerning 
foreign State immunity, see Sciso E., Italian Judges’ Point of View on Foreign State 
immunity, in VJIL (2011), Vol. 44: 1201-1231. 
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serious violations of IHL33. Italy argued that the reasoning and the 
conclusion provided to the Italian victims applied mutatis mutandis to the 
proceedings relating to the enforcement in Italy of the Greek judgment 
concerning the Distomo massacre. Since the Greek judgment concerned a 
case which presented much of the same features which were present in the 
Italian cases, including the fact that Greek victims had tried to obtain 
reparation before the German courts and were repeatedly confronted with 
a denial of justice34, the recognition that the Greek judgment in the Distomo 
case could be enforced in Italy does not amount to a violation of 
international law. 
The reason why the Court refused to follow the Parties’ private 
international law approach in order to determine whether the Florence 
Court of Appeal had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by 
declaring the Greek decision to be enforceable in Italy was simply because 
of the fact that taking the applicable PIL rules into account would have 
obliged the ICJ to pronounce “itself” on the question of whether the Greek 
courts had themselves violated Germany’s immunity. Something that the 
court could not do, since Greece did not have the status of a party to the 
proceedings in question35. Therefore, the Court decided to address the 
issue “from a significantly different viewpoint”: as nothing prevents 
national courts from ascertaining (before granting exequatur) that the 
foreign judgment had been rendered in respect of the immunity of the 
respondent State, the Court affirmed that “Where a court is seized, as in 
the present case, of an application for exequatur of a foreign judgment 
                                                 
33 Counter-Memorial of Italy, para 6.39, www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16648.pdf. 
34 In September 1995, the Greek plaintiffs had brought action for a declaratory 
judgment before the Landgericht (Regional Court) of Boon, claiming Germany’s liability 
to pay compensation for the massacre. The regional Court dismissed the action 
(Landgericht Bonn, 1 O 358/95 (June 23, 1997); the plaintiffs therefore lodged an appeal 
before the OLG, the Higher Regional Court of Cologne, which upheld the lower court’s 
decision. In the already mentioned judgment of 26 June 2003, the Bundesgerchtshof (the 
German Federal Supreme Court) again rejected the plaintiffs’ application for revision. 
Against these German courts’ decisions, the plaintiffs filed a constitutional complaint at 
the German Federal Constitutional Court ( BVerfG), and their allegations (violations of 
their right to have access to a court, their right to a hearing in accordance with the law, 
their general personality right, and their right to physical integrity, as protected by the 
German Basic Law) were again rejected as being inadmissible (Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(BVerfG), February 15, 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entsche 
idungen/rk20060215_2bvr147603.html., see Rau M., State Liability for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law- The Distomo Case Before the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, 7 German Law Journal (2007), 701  
35 Judgment, para. 127. 
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against a third State, it is itself being called upon to exercise its jurisdiction 
in respect of the third State in question”. In granting or refusing exequatur, 
“the courts exercise a jurisdictional power which results in the foreign 
judgment being given effects corresponding to those of a judgment on the 
merits in the requested State”, with the consequence that “the proceedings 
brought before that court must therefore be regarded as being conducted 
against the third State which was the subject of the foreign judgment”36. It 
followed, for the ICJ, that a court seized of the application for exequatur of 
a foreign judgment against a third State has to ask itself whether, in the 
event that it had itself been seized of the merits of a dispute identical to 
that which was the subject of the foreign judgment, it would have been 
obliged under international law to accord immunity to the respondent 
State37. 
On this relevant question, the ICJ decided that the Italian courts, if 
they had been seized of the merits of a case identical to that which was the 
subject of the Greek decisions, should have been obliged to grant 
immunity to Germany. Consequently, they could not have granted 
exequatur to the Greek decisions without thereby violating Germany’s 
jurisdictional immunity38. In reaching such a decision, the Court confined 
itself to considering, in general terms, that the fact that Germany might 
have waived its immunity before the courts hearing the case on the merits, 
does not bar the respondent’s immunity in exequatur proceedings 
instituted in another State39.  
 
 
2.1 – Evaluation of the Court’s reasoning: its correctness and weakness 
in the light of the preliminary unconvincing solution given in respect to 
the violation of Germany’s jurisdictional immunity in proceedings 
brought before the Italian courts by Italian claimants 
 
The ICJ’s reasoning is correct in several respects, except (in our opinion) 
for the conclusion reached, according to which the conduct of the Italian 
courts is to be qualified as being inconsistent with the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity under current international law.  
Regarding the ICJ’s arguments, it is certainly true that exequatur 
proceedings, according to which a court declares a pecuniary award 
                                                 
36 Judgment, para. 128. 
37 Judgment, para. 130. 
38 Judgment, para. 131. 
39 Judgment, para. 132. 
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rendered against a third State to be enforceable in the forum, are an 
“exercise of jurisdictional power”. The legal procedure by which foreign 
judgments are given res judicata effects and declared enforceable (thus 
given effects corresponding to those of a judgment on the merits rendered 
in the requested State) entails an act which is exactly an exercise of 
jurisdiction on the part of the requested State. The foreign judgment in 
itself, in the absence of treaty commitments which provide for its 
automatic recognition and enforcement abroad, does not have any 
authority and effectiveness outside the country of origin. When there are 
certain legal provisions, like the Italian and German laws mentioned 
above, which make the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment 
dependent on various conditions being fulfilled, the insertion of the 
foreign judgment into the domestic legal order of the requested State, as 
well as its “efficacy”, depends on a judicial decision (exequatur) that has 
“constitutive” effect. Without this jurisdictional act, the foreign judgment 
cannot extend its effects in the country of reception. In sum, the foreign 
judgment can be considered a valid title for execution only insofar as its 
efficacy has been declared by a court of the State in which the party seeks 
authorization for enforcement. Article 67 of the Italian law on private 
international law subjects the enforceability in the forum of any foreign 
judgment to a special procedure, which is necessary in order to ascertain 
that there are no grounds for the refusal of recognition as referred to in the 
same Italian law. This special procedure (declaration of enforceability) is 
undeniably an act of State40. 
Secondly, irrespective of the fact that a declaration of enforceability 
is to be distinguished from actual enforcement, the ICJ was correct in 
asserting that exequatur proceedings must be regarded as being “directed 
against” the State which was the subject of the foreign judgment: such 
proceedings, in fact, are a preliminary step leading to actual execution 
against the assets of the foreign State. According to the United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of the State, proceedings before a 
court of a State shall be considered to have been instituted against another 
State (not named as a party to the proceedings) when such a proceeding in 
effect “seeks to affect the property, rights, interests or activities of that 
other State”41. Therefore, Germany was entitled to object to the decision of 
the Florence Court of Appeal granting exequatur to the Greek decision.  
                                                 
40 Morelli, Diritto processuale civile internazionale, 2ª ed., Padova, 1954, 278 ff, 286 ff. 
41 Article 6, para. 2 of the United Convention on Jurisdictional immunity of States and 
their properties, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 2 December 
2004, not yet in force. 
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In support of the conclusion that a court seized of an application for 
exequatur of a foreign judgment must itself deal with the question of 
immunity from jurisdiction for the respondent State, the ICJ cited two 
judgments: one by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kuwait Airways Corp. 
v. Iraq, and a second judgment by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 
NML Capital Limited v. Republic of Argentina. The first case arose out of 
Kuwait Airways Corp’s action for damages against Iraqi Airways for the 
appropriation of its aircraft, equipment, and parts during the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait. An English court awarded $ 84 million in damages 
against Iraq, as it held that Iraq could not rely upon its State immunity 
because of its involvement in the defense related to its commercial 
interests. KAC applied for the recognition of that judgment in the Quebec 
Superior Court, and Iraq, relying on its immunity, moved for the dismissal 
of the application for recognition on the ground that the impugned acts 
were sovereign acts and that the Quebec court could not simply recognize 
the foreign court’s finding that State immunity did not apply. According 
to Iraq, the Quebec court had to decide this issue on its own. Although the 
Canadian conflict of laws rules establish that the enforcing court shall not 
review the merits of a foreign decision, the Supreme Court of Canada 
agreed with Iraq’s defense, stating that it did not matter that the issue of 
state immunity had already been decided, and that this issue (as well as 
the State immunity exception) must be considered within the framework 
of the law currently applicable in Canada, including public international 
law. In any case, Iraq’s victory was illusory as, ultimately, the Supreme 
Court of Canada agreed with the British court that Iraq could not rely 
upon its state immunity42.  
The case decided by the United Kingdom Supreme Court related to 
the legal consequences of the Argentinean debt crisis in 2001-2003, and the 
efforts of worldwide investors to recoup as much as possible of their 
investments in this country. In 1994, the Republic of Argentina issued a 
series of sovereign bonds, containing a clause dealing with jurisdiction 
and immunity in relation to claims against the bonds and subject to New 
York law. NML Capital Ltd bought a number of these bonds and, in 2003, 
declared “events of default” based on the subsequent failures by 
Argentina to pay interest. Refusing to accept the Argentinian offer to 
restructure its external debt, NML brought a claim in New York seeking 
payment of the principal amount of the bonds that had become due ($ 284 
                                                 
42 Supreme Court of Canada, Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraq, 21 October 2010, [2010] 2 
SCR, 571. 
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m). In 2006 the US District Court of the Southern District of New York 
entered judgment against Argentina in favour of NML for the sum 
claimed. NML then sought to enforce this judgment against assets held by 
Argentina in the UK. Argentina applied to have this order set aside, 
arguing that, as a sovereign State, it was immune from suit under section 1 
of the State Immunity Act 1978, which grants general immunity to States 
unless specific exceptions apply. The Court of Appeal upheld this 
argument in February 2010. NML subsequently appealed against this 
judgment before the Supreme Court.  
The question before the United Kingdom Supreme Court was 
whether such an investor could enforce its judgment against assets 
belonging to the Argentinean State in the United Kingdom, 
notwithstanding the Argentinean allegation of immunity. In unanimously 
allowing NML Capital’s appeal, the Supreme Court held that it was 
entitled to do so. In order to determine whether, under English law, 
Argentina enjoyed State immunity in relation to the recognition and 
enforcement of the New York judgment, the Court stated that this  
 
“question ought to be answered in the light of the restrictive doctrine 
of State immunity under international law. There is no principle of 
international law under which State A is immune from proceedings 
brought in State B in order to enforce a judgment given against it by 
the courts of State C, where State A did not enjoy immunity in respect 
of the proceedings that gave rise to that judgment. Under 
international law the question of whether Argentina enjoys immunity 
in these proceedings depends upon whether Argentina’s liability 
arises out of acta jure imperii or acta jure gestionis. This involves 
consideration of the nature of the underlying transaction that gave 
rise to the New York judgment. The fact that NML is seeking to 
enforce that judgment in this jurisdiction by means of an action on 
the judgment does not bear on the question of immunity.”  
 
In answering the question whether the foreign creditor, seeking to enforce 
the New York judgment in the UK, would have been precluded by English 
law from suing the foreign State, had it chosen to sue it in the United 
Kingdom, Lords Phillips and Clarke found that the claim would have 
been upheld by the State Immunity Act 1978, s. [3(1)(a)]. Lords Mance, 
Collins and Walker, while disagreeing on this point, nevertheless all 
agreed that Argentina would have been prevented from claiming State 
immunity in respect of these proceedings by reason of the provisions of s. 
31 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (which gave effect to 
the Brussels Convention of 1968) and by Argentina’s submission and 
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waiver of immunity concerning the bonds. Lord Phillips neatly 
summarized the effect of s.31:  
 
“State immunity cannot be raised as a bar to the recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign judgment if, under the principles of 
international law recognized in this jurisdiction, the State against 
whom the judgment was given was not entitled to immunity in 
respect of the claim”43. 
 
Both judgments mentioned by the ICJ support its conclusion that a 
court seized of an application for exequatur of a foreign judgment against a 
third State has to ask itself whether the respondent State enjoys immunity 
from jurisdictions, having regard to the “nature of the case in which that 
judgment was given”. The reasoning of the World Court is well 
constructed and logical. Equally logical and coherent is its conclusion that 
the Italian courts had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by 
declaring the decisions of the Greek courts on the Distomo massacre to be 
enforceable, for the reason that, according to the ICJ, the Italian courts 
would have been obliged to grant immunity to that State if they had been 
seized of the merits of cases identical to those which were the subject of 
the Greek decisions.  
The weakness of such a conclusion lies in the fact that its 
“correctness” depends on the appropriateness of the solutions given by 
the Court to a number of public international law issues. The ICJ’s 
assertion that the decisions of the Italian courts, granting exequatur to the 
foreign Greek decisions, had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity 
is in fact exactly the same as that set out by the Court in Section III of the 
judgment in respect of Germany’s first submission. In order to determine 
whether the Italian courts had breached Italy’s obligation to accord 
jurisdictional immunity to Germany by exercising jurisdiction over 
Germany with regard to the claims brought before them by various Italian 
claimants, the ICJ considered each of the Italian arguments separately and 
rejected all of them individually as well as the idea, suggested by Italy, 
that they could have worked in conjunction44. With regard to the 
“territorial tort exception”, and contrary to what was asserted by the 
Italian and Greek courts (according to which contemporary customary 
international law has developed an exception to the principle of State 
immunity in respect of acts occasioning death, personal injuries or damage 
                                                 
43 United Kingdom Supreme Court, NML Capital Limited (Appellant) v. Republic of 
Argentina (Respondent), [2011] UKSC 31, On appeal from [2010] EWCA Civ 41. 
44 Judgment, para. 106. 
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to property in the territory of the forum State, even if the acts in question 
were carried out jure imperii)45, the Court concluded that no territorial 
exception applied in the cases in question. According to the Court, 
customary international law continues to require “that a State be accorded 
immunity in proceedings for torts allegedly committed on the territory of 
another State by its armed forces and other organs of State in the course of 
conducting an armed conflict”.46 In respect of the Italian argument 
concerning the subject-matter and specific circumstances of the claims in 
the Italian courts, the Court rejected the argument that the denial of 
immunity was justified by the gravity of the violations and of the unlawful 
acts (war crimes and crimes against humanity) and that customary 
international law has developed to a point that a State is not entitled to 
immunity in cases of violations of the peremptory rules of international 
law (jus cogens). The ICJ concluded that under customary international law 
(as it currently stands) “a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of 
the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human 
rights law or the international law of armed conflict”. Again, on the 
relationship between jus cogens and the rule of State immunity, the Court 
rejected the Italian argument that under international law a jus cogens rule 
should override not only “directly” inconsistent obligations under 
international law, but also obligations under international law that would 
reduce its effectiveness (i.e. jurisdictional State immunity for claims arising 
out of its breach). The Court excluded the existence of a conflict between 
rules of jus cogens and the rule of international customary law which 
requires jurisdictional immunity to be given, stating that the two sets of 
rules address different matters, one relating to substance and one relating 
to procedure. As the rules on State immunity are “procedural in character”, 
and confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State may 
exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State, the Court asserted that the 
rules which determine the scope and extent of the jurisdictional immunity 
of States do not derogate from “substantive rules” which posses jus cogens 
status47. Finally, the ICJ also rejected the Italian “last resort” argument, 
according to which the Italian courts were justified in denying Germany 
                                                 
45 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Areios Pagos Full Court, 
Judgments Nos. 36 and 37/2002, 28 June 2002, reported under “Facts” of the European 
Court of Human Rights Kalogeropoulu Case, App. No. 59021/00, 12 December 2002 
(Admissibility). For a comment on this point see Reinish A., European Court Practice 
Concerning State Immunity From Enforcement measure, Eur J Int Law (2006) 17 (4), 816.  
46 Judgment, para. 78. 
47 Judgment, para. 95. 
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its immunity because all attempts to secure compensation for the various 
groups of victims involved in the Italian proceedings had failed; the same 
was also true for the Greek victims48. The Court refused this Italian 
contention by stating that it could find no basis in State practice “that 
international law makes the entitlement of a State to immunity dependent 
upon the existence of effective alternatives of securing redress”49. In 
conclusion, the Court held that the decision of the Italian courts to deny 
immunity to Germany with regard to proceedings brought by the Italian 
claimants in the Italian courts cannot be justified on the basis of customary 
international law and therefore constituted a breach of the obligation 
owed by Italy to Germany. Accordingly, the Italian courts could not grant 
exequatur to the Greek decision rendered against Germany “without 
thereby violating Germany’s jurisdictional immunity”50. 
The assessment of whether the ICJ’s decision is “right” from the 
point of view of the current state of public international law is obviously 
something that cannot be discussed in this paper51. For our purpose, it is 
sufficient to observe that much of the ICJ’s reasoning has been 
authoritatively criticized by leading public law scholars, who are also 
judges at the same court. This not to say that the remaining Judges of the 
World Court are not “leading” scholars in public international law; it is 
simply that, in our opinion, the authoritative critics of this judgment are 
very impressive and deserve attention: the correctness of the World 
Court’s judgment cannot only be founded on assuring the certainty of the 
law52; it should also be evaluated in the light of the fundamental principle 
that immunity from jurisdiction should only be granted when this is 
consonant “with justice and with the equitable protection of the Parties”53. 
                                                 
48 Supra, footnote 31. 
49 Judgment, para. 101. According to Zgonec-Rozej M., No Reparation for the Victims 
of Nazi War Crimes. The judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Germany 
v. Italy, Greece Intervening, April 24th 2012, http://www.ejiltalk.org/germany-v-italy-
germany-wins/, the ICJ departed on this issue from its previous reasoning in the Arrest 
Warrant case, where “the availability of venues argument was referred to in support of 
the Court’s determination”. 
50 Judgment, para. 131. 
51 For a recent critical comment concerning the judgment, see Trapp K. N., Mills, A., 
Smooth Runs the Water where the Brook is Depp: the obscured Complexities f Germany 
v Italy, CJIL (1) (2012) 153-168; Zgnonec-Rozej M,, No Reparation of the Victims of Nazi 
War Crimes- The Judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Germany v. 
Italy, Greece Intervening, April 24th, 2012. 
52 Bianchi A., On Certainty, EJIL Talk, February 16, 2012, http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/ 
abianchi/. 
53 Higgins R., Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. 
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In his separate opinion, Judge Bennouna, while agreeing with the 
operative part of the ICJ’s judgment, nevertheless stated that he could not 
support the logic of its reasoning: the Judge started by noting that when 
the question of jurisdictional immunity arises in connection with 
international crimes, it raises “fundamental ethical and juridical problems 
for the international community as a whole, which cannot be evaded 
simply by characterizing immunity as a simple matter of procedure” 
(para. 9). According to Judge Bennouna, the Court of Justice should have 
followed a different approach in order to strike “an equal balance between 
State sovereignties and the considerations of justice and equity operating 
within such sovereignties” (para. 18); the Court could not have rejected 
the Italian “last resort” argument (as it did in para. 103 of its judgment) 
“on the pretext of the absence of supporting State practice or 
jurisprudence”, rather it should have applied and interpreted the 
international law on State immunity taking into account the 
complementary nature of the law governing State responsibility (para. 27). 
Judge Bennouna reproached the Court of Justice for having confined its 
primordial function (serving international justice) within “a narrow, 
formalistic approach, which considers immunity alone, strictu sensu, 
without concern for the victims of international crimes seeking justice” 
(para. 28), and for having relied upon a “mechanical” conception of the 
judicial task by imposing on national judges the rules on immunity “as a 
preliminary issue, without considering the specific circumstances of each 
case” (para. 29). Lastly, he regretted that the Court’s reasoning  
 
“was not founded on the characteristics of contemporary 
international law, where immunity, as one element of the mechanism 
for the allocation of jurisdiction, could not be justified if it would 
ultimately pose an obstacle to the requirements of the justice owed to 
victims” (para. 31).  
 
Such reproaches concerning the ICJ’s judgment are so grave as to even 
question the consistency of Judge Bennouna’s adhesion to its operative 
part.  
Judge Ad Hoc Gaja, in his dissenting opinion, argued (extensively 
and convincingly) against the ICJ’s conclusion that the decision of the 
Italian courts to deny immunity to Germany could not be justified on the 
basis of the territorial tort principle. 
                                                                                                                                     
INT'L L. REV. 265, 271 (1982). 
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Judge Cançado Trindade, in his dissenting opinion concerning all of 
the ICJ’s findings, discussed at length the international legal doctrine and 
the growing opinion sustaining the removal of immunity in cases of 
international crimes, for which reparations are sought by the victims, and 
concluded that “it is nowadays generally acknowledged that criminal 
State policies and the ensuing perpetration of State atrocities cannot at all 
be covered up by the shield of State immunity” (para. 52); he further 
argued that to admit the removal of State immunity within the realm of 
trade relations, or in respect of local personal torts, and at the same time to 
insist on shielding States with immunity in cases of international crimes, 
“amounts to a juridical absurdity” (para. 239). Finally, Judge Cançado 
Trindade argued for the inadmissibility of the Inter-State waiver of the 
rights of individual victims of grave violations of international law (paras. 
69-72).  
The lack of an adequate analysis of the “core issue” of the dispute 
before the ICJ, i.e. the obligation to make reparations for violations of 
international humanitarian law, intimately linked to the denial of State 
immunity, was lengthily discussed by Judge Yusuf in his dissenting 
opinion; Judge Yusuf also disagreed with the reasoning and conclusions of 
the majority of the Court on the scope and extent of State immunity in 
international law and the derogations that may be made from it, as well as 
with the approach adopted by the Court towards the role of national 
courts in the identification and evolution of international customary 
norms, particularly in the area of State immunity from jurisdiction for acta 
jure imperii in violation of human rights and humanitarian law. According 
to Judge Yusuf, the scope of State immunity is “as full of holes as Swiss 
cheese”, and in the light of considerable divergence in the practice of 
States and in the judicial decisions of their courts, the reasoning followed 
by the Court - which characterized some of the exceptions to immunity as 
part to the customary international law, despite the persistence of 
conflicting domestic judicial decisions on their application, while 
interpreting other exceptions (similarly based on divergent court 
decisions, as supporting the non-existence of customary norms - “may 
give the impression of cherry-picking, particularly where the numbers of 
cases invoked is rather limited on both sides of the equation” (para. 23).  
In conclusion, many arguments run against this very conservative 
judgment and the restrictive interpretation given by the Court of Justice to 
the continuously evolving doctrine of State immunity. As Amnesty 
International has convincingly argued in its position paper, the restriction 
to sovereign immunity advocated by the Italian courts (in relation to 
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claims brought before them by victims of international humanitarian law 
and crimes against humanity who have been unable to bring their claim 
for reparation in other fora) should have been considered by the ICJ to be 
“consistent with established State practice”; this is because this restriction  
 
“is narrowly defined, manageable, and routed in established 
principles of international law” and does not “interfere with the core 
purpose of sovereign immunity: to ensure the effective orderly 
conduct of international relations”54. 
 
 
2.2 – The external private international law context of the ICJ’s 
judgment: the ECJ’s Lechouritou judgment 
 
The logical consequence of the ICJ’s decision that the Florence Court of 
Appeal’s enforcement of the Greek judgments was in itself incompatible 
with international law is that the Italian court should have refused it. 
According to general international law, States are under no obligation to 
recognize and/or enforce foreign judgments; therefore, a refusal to enforce 
a foreign judgment entails, in principle, no international responsibility55. A 
problem of conflicting international obligations may nevertheless arise if 
the State in question (and therefore its national courts) is subject to a 
Treaty commitment to recognize and enforce foreign judgments.  
Unsurprisingly, this problem was raised in 2005 by a Greek court, 
the Patras Court of Appeal, by referring a preliminary ruling to the 
European Court of Justice in relation to the interpretation of Article 1 of 
the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, and further amendments 
(the Brussels Convention). The reference was made in relation to 
proceedings between Greek nationals resident in Greece and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, concerning compensation for the financial loss and 
non-material damages which the plaintiffs (the descendents of the victims 
of a massacre carried out by German soldiers on 13 December 1943 in the 
village of Kalavrita) had suffered as a result of the acts perpetrated by the 
German armed forces at the time of the occupation of Greece during the 
                                                 
54 Amnesty International, Germany v. Italy: The Right to Deny State Immunity When 
Victims Have No Other Recourse, 2011, 6 ff.  
55 Michaels R., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, online edition of 
the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, www.mpepil.com, 9. 
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Second World War56. In 1995, these victims (Ms Lechouritou and others) 
brought an action based on the Brussels Convention [in particular under 
its Art. 5 (3) and (4)] in the Kalavrita Court of First Instance, claiming 
compensation from the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1998, this court, 
before which Germany did not enter an appearance, dismissed the claim 
on the grounds that the Greek courts lacked jurisdiction because the 
defendant (the Federal Republic of Germany) enjoyed the privilege of 
immunity in accordance with Article 3 (2) of the Greek Code of Civil 
Procedure. The defendants then appealed in 1999 to the Patras Court of 
Appeal, which decided (two years later) to stay the proceedings to await a 
ruling which was pending at the Greek Superior Special Court in a parallel 
case concerning the interpretation of international rules on the immunity 
of sovereign States from legal proceedings. More specifically, that case 
concerned other claims brought against Germany by Greek nationals 
before the Greek courts: it is referred to as the Margellos case, involving 
civil claims for compensation for acts committed by the German armed 
forces in the village of Lidoriki in 1944. The Greek Superior Special Court, 
seized of the matter according to the Greek Constitution (Article 100, 
para.1 lit f.), was requested to decide whether generally recognized rules 
of international law covered atrocities committed by German troops in the 
territories under occupation. By six votes to five, the Court decided that 
Germany was entitled to immunity without any restrictions or exceptions 
before any Greek Civil Courts for torts committed on Greek territory by its 
armed forces during World War II57. The Special Court, after an evaluation 
of the Al-Adsami judgment by the ECHR court58, and the Arrest Warrant 
judgment by the ICJ59, concluded that - contrary to what was asserted by 
the lower courts - a customary international law rule (excluding certain 
acts from the law of State immunity) does not (yet) exist, thus indirectly 
overruling the Areios Pagos in parallel proceedings granting immunity to 
Germany (in the Distomo case)60. 
                                                 
56 Lechouritou and others v. the State of the Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-292/05, OJ 
C 243, 1 October 2005 (Lechouritou). 
57 Special Supreme Court of Greece, Margellos and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
case No. 6/2002, 129 ILR (2007) 526. 
58 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom [GC], Application No. 35763/97, Judgment of 21 
November 2001, ECHR Reports 2001-XI, p. 101, para. 61; ILR, Vol. 123, 24 ff. 
59 ICJ: Congo v. Belgium, Judgment of 14 February 2002, para. 58. 
60 Judgment of the Special Highest Court, para. 14, lit (a) – (e). See Bartsch K., Elberling 
B., Jus Cogens vs. State Immunity, Round Two: The Decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulu at al. v. Greece and Germany Decision, German Law 
Journal (2003) 477, 481 f.  
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After this ruling, the Patras Court of Appeal (Efetio Patron) decided 
to stay its proceedings and to refer two questions to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling, by reason of the connection between the 
claims brought by the appellants and the Community legislation: in short, 
the Court asked the Court of Justice whether the Brussels Convention 
applies to actions for compensation brought by individuals against a 
Contracting State in respect of loss and damages caused by occupying 
forces during an armed conflict; secondly, whether it is compatible with 
the system of the Brussels Convention for the defendant State to put 
forward a plea of immunity, with the result, should the answer be in the 
affirmative, that the very application of the Convention is neutralized in 
respect of acts and omissions by the defendant’s armed forces which 
occurred before the Convention entered into force61. 
As to the first question (the applicability of the Brussels 
Convention), the European Court of Justice (following the opinion of 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, and its settled case law on the 
concept of “civil matters”), ruled that  
 
«… “civil matters” within the meaning of [Art. 1 Brussels 
Convention] does not cover a legal action brought by natural persons 
in a Contracting State against another Contracting State for 
compensation in respect of the loss or damage suffered by the 
successors of the victims of acts perpetrated by armed forces in the 
course of warfare in the territory of the first State».  
 
According to the Court, the legal action for compensation brought by the 
plaintiffs in the main proceedings against Germany (derived from 
operations conducted by armed forces during the Second World War) are 
to be considered 
 
“one of the characteristic emanations of State sovereignty in 
particular inasmuch as they are decided upon in a unilateral and 
binding manner by the competent public authorities and appear as 
inextricably linked to States' foreign and defense policy”62.  
 
Being acta jure imperii, the European Court concluded that they do not fall 
within the scope ratione materiae of the Brussels Convention. The Court 
also held that its conclusion could not be affected by the plaintiffs’ line of 
argument set out in the main proceedings, according to which, first, the 
action brought before the Greek courts against Germany was to be 
                                                 
61 See the Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, paras. 12-16. 
62 Lechouritou, para. 37. 
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regarded as being of a “civil nature” [covered by Article 5 (3) and (4)], and 
second, that acts carried out jure imperii “do not include illegal or wrongful 
actions”. In respect of the first objection, the Court ruled that the civil 
nature of the proceedings is irrelevant in respect of a legal action which 
arises from an act that does not fall within the scope ratione materiae of the 
Brussels Convention. The Court, and the Advocate General, linked their 
argumentation to the “cause of action” (the massacre perpetrated by 
German armed forces) and not to the “subject-matter of the action”, i.e. the 
purpose of the action, stating that the fact that the public authority acted 
in the exercise of its powers is sufficient for the exclusion of the claim, 
based thereon, from the scope of the Convention63. Had the Court based 
its judgment not on the legal relationship between the parties (one of 
which was exercising public powers) but upon the second criterion (the 
subject-matter of the proceedings), it would have reached the opposite 
result64. 
As to the second objection, raised by the plaintiffs and the Polish 
Government, that the concept of acts jure imperii does not include 
wrongful acts, and that serious violations of human rights, such as the 
massacre carried out on Greek soil, cannot be regarded as acta jure imperii, 
but rather as acta jure gestionis, therefore falling within the scope of the 
Brussels Convention, the Court objected that  
 
“the question as to whether or not the acts carried out in the exercise 
of public powers that constitute the basis for the main proceedings 
are lawful concerns the nature of those acts, but not the field within 
which they fall. Since that field as such must be regarded as not 
falling within the scope of the Brussels Convention, the unlawfulness 
of such acts cannot justify a different interpretation”.  
 
Thus, as contended by the Advocate General, the wrongfulness of the acts 
does not affect their classification but rather their consequences. The 
Advocate General also rejected another objection raised by the Polish 
                                                 
63 For an analysis of the Court’s criteria on which the exclusion has been based, see 
Gärtner V, The Brussels Convention and Reparations – Remarks on the Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in Lechouritou and others v. the State of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, GLJ , Vol. 08 No. 04, 2007, 420 ff.; Feraci O., La sentenza Lechouritou e l’ambito 
di applicazione ratione materiae della convenzione di Bruxelles del 27 settembre 1968, 
RDIPP, 2007, 660 ff. 
64 For the position that the Lechouritou decision represents a change from prior ECJ 
jurisprudence, in the sense that the Court accepted as sufficient (in order to exclude this 
dispute from the scope of the Convention) just one of the two mentioned aspects (the 
nature of the relation between the parties), see Requejo (2007), I-208. 
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government, according to which public authority must be exercised within 
the territorial boundaries of a State, with the consequence that operations 
carried out by armed forces of a State outside its territory may not be 
regarded as acta jure imperii65. 
It is interesting to note that in 2007 the European Court of Justice 
arrived (on the basis of a pure international civil procedure/private 
international law perspective) at the same conclusions reached in 2012 by 
the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy, Greece 
intervening) case on corresponding issues raised in relation to the scope 
and extent of State immunity. This is true in particular concerning the 
classification of the acts, on which the proceedings in the various courts 
had their origin, as acta jure imperii, notwithstanding their unlawfulness 
(which was never contested). The ICJ ruled that the distinction between 
those acta and acta jure gestionis (concerning the non-sovereign activities of 
a State) has to be applied “before” that jurisdiction can be exercised, 
whereas the legality or illegality of the acts is something that can be 
determined only in the exercise of that jurisdiction66. Analogously, the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the issue of whether the Convention 
applies to the main proceedings based on acts carried out in the exercise of 
public powers “logically constitutes a prior question”, rendering 
“immaterial” the reference made by the plaintiffs to the substantive rules 
of the Brussels Convention. Secondly, the European Court of Justice 
argued that if the unlawfulness of the acts should be considered to affect 
their classification, this would raise preliminary questions of “substance” 
even before the scope of the Brussels Convention can be determined with 
certainty; something that would run against the objective of that 
Convention. Furthermore, the Advocate General objected that the 
suggested approach would also lead to difficulties with regard to liability, 
because if the acts concerned were to be characterized as jure gestionis “it 
would only be possible to attribute liability to the persons who actually 
caused the damages rather than to the authorities to which they belong”67. 
In the main proceedings the claims were nevertheless brought against 
Germany and not against the individual soldiers concerned. In view of the 
reply given to the first preliminary question, the European Court of Justice 
found that there was no need to answer the Patras Court of Appeal’s 
second question on the compatibility of the privilege of States’ 
                                                 
65 Opinion of the Advocate General, paras. 67-69.  
66 Judgment, para. 60. 
67 Opinion of the Advocate General, para. 65. 
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jurisdictional immunity from legal proceedings with the system of the 
Brussels Convention. Should the Court have decided to answer the 
question, surely it would have followed the opinion of its Advocate 
General who had anticipated (many years earlier) the 
procedural/substantive distinction used by the ICJ in its recent judgment. 
While recognizing that, in respect of the concept of State immunity from 
legal proceedings, there is “evidence of a tendency to lift State immunity 
in respect of acta jure imperii in cases where human rights are breached”, 
the AG suggested to the European Court that it should consider “that 
State immunity is created as a procedural bar which prevents the courts of 
one State from giving judgments on the liability of another”; the issue of 
State immunity must therefore be addressed “before” considering the 
Brussels Convention. In any case, as stated by the AG, the issue whether 
States can assert jurisdictional immunity in disputes involving civil claims 
based on violations of international humanitarian law, as in the present 
case brought before the ECJ, and its implication with regard to human 
rights, “is not within the powers of the Court of Justice”68.  
Against this ECJ judgment, Ms Lechouritou and others brought an 
application before the European Court of Human Rights against Germany, 
the 26 other Member States of the European Union and the European 
Union itself; according to the plaintiffs the refusal of the European Court 
of Justice to declare the Brussels Convention to be applicable to their civil 
compensation claims infringed their rights under the European 
Convention (Arts. 6 and 13, as well as Art. 1 of Additional Protocol no. 1). 
On 3 April 2012, the Court declared the application inadmissible against 
the European Union due to its incompatibility ratione personae with the 
rules of the European Convention on Human Rights [art. 35 § 3 (a)], as the 
EU had not yet adhered to the said Convention. The Court stated, 
therefore, that its task consisted only of judging whether the 27 Member 
States of the EU “peuvent être tenus responsables de l’arrêt de la Court de 
Justice”, immediately after rejecting this contention. The court observed 
that  
 
“la Cour de Justice, compétente pour interpreter la Convention de 
Bruxells en vertu du protocole du 3 juin 1971 ... a amplement motivé 
                                                 
68 Opinion of the Advocate General, para. 78; on the distinction between jurisdictional 
immunities of States and the issue of the applicability of the Brussels Convention 
/Brussels I regulation system, see: Leandro A., Limiti materiali del regolamento (CE) N. 
44/2001 e immunità degli Stati esteri dalla giurisdizione: il caso Lechouritou, in RDI, 
2007, 766 ff. 
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son arrêt et a exposé de manière circonstanciée pourquoi l’action des 
requérants devant les juridictions grecques ne tombait pas sous le 
coup de cette convention. Rien ne permet de dire que l’interprétation 
des dispositions de la Convention de Bruxelles par la Cour de Justice 
était entachée de considérations arbitraires un manifestement 
déraisonnables, ce qui pourrait amener la Cour à constater une 
violation de la Convention”. 
 
The court therefore concluded that ”ce grief est manifestement mal fondé 
et doit être rejeté en application de l’art. 35 §§ 3 (a) et 4 de la 
Convention”69. 
 
 
2.3 – The problematic role of secondary European legislation (in the 
field of judicial cooperation in civil matters) on human rights claims 
against a State 
 
Another point of relevant interest in the Lechouritou judgment is the 
explicit reference made by the European Court to European secondary 
legislation enacted in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters in 
order to promote, at the European level, the mutual recognition of judicial 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, including the abolition of the 
exequatur procedure. This reference was made by the Court in the 
penultimate paragraph of its judgment in order to substantiate its 
reasoning that acts perpetrated by a public authority are excluded from 
the scope of the Brussels Convention. The Court specifically referred to 
Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for 
uncontested claims70, and to Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a 
European order for payment procedure71. Both provide, in their Article 
2(1), that they apply to civil and commercial matters with the exclusion of 
“… the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State 
authority (acta jure imperii)” without drawing “a distinction in that regard 
according to whether or not the acts or omissions are lawful”72. These 
references had been approved in the doctrine as they reflect “the goal of 
the Court to enhance a coherent system of Community measures”, by 
                                                 
69 Application No. 37937/07, Irini Lechouritou et autres, 3 April 2012. 
70 OJ 2004 L 143, 15. 
71 OJ 2006 L 399, p. 1. 
72 Lechoritou, para. 45. 
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dealing with the Brussels Convention as being part of 
Community/European law, despite its Treaty nature73. It is worth 
remembering, in this respect, that the material scope (civil and commercial 
matters) of Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 is the same as that of Regulation 
(EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on the jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(Brussels I), which (in turn) is identical to that of the Brussels Convention, 
that it replaced on 1 March 2002.  
In our opinion, the affirmed “consistency” between the Brussels 
Convention and the subsequent European Regulations (enacted by the EU 
legislator, following the conferral upon it (by the Treaty of Amsterdam) of 
the competence to legislate in the area of private international law instead 
of the Member States) is a “forcing” interpretation, in the sense that the 
decision to amend the scope ratione materiae of these Regulations, the 
successors of the Brussels Convention, has come much later and found its 
rationale in purely “political” reasons which have nothing to do with the 
classification of a matter as “civil or commercial” in the sense of Article 1 
of the Brussels Convention. Among the multitude of European legislative 
acts enacted by the European legislator in the field of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters, Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 represents the necessary 
step which is required by the European Council (in its Tampere 
conclusions) to facilitate access to enforcement in a Member State other 
than that in which the judgment has been given; the idea is that 
enforcement should be accelerated and simplified by dispensing with any 
intermediate measures to be taken prior to enforcement in the Member 
State in which enforcement is sought. The Regulation in question is exactly 
designated to enable creditors who have obtained an enforceable 
judgment in respect of a pecuniary claim, which has not been contested by 
the debtor, to have it enforced directly in another Member State. Its aim is 
the elimination of any intermediate measures that are currently necessary 
for enforcement in various Member States (the exequatur procedure). Thus, 
a judgment that has been certified as a European Enforcement Order by 
the court of origin must be dealt with, for enforcement purposes, as if it 
had been delivered in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. 
The aforementioned provision in Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004, which 
excludes acta jure imperii from its scope of application, (and consequently 
from Article 1 of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation, as the 
European Court of Justice stated in the Lechouritou judgment), was not 
                                                 
73 Gärtner V (2007), 440 f. 
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present in the initial Commission Proposal for the Regulation on the 
European enforcement order74. It appeared for the first time in the 
European Council Common Position (CE) of 6 February 200475. In its 
Communication to the European Parliament, on 9 February 2004, the 
Commission explained this amendment to Article 2 by simply stating that 
it has been introduced  
 
“to clarify that the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the 
exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii) does not constitute a civil 
and commercial matter and does therefore not fall within the scope of 
this Regulation”76.  
 
This new formulation has subsequently been repeated in several other 
Regulations, like the already mentioned Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 
creating a European Order for payment procedures, as well as in 
Regulation (EC) No. 864/2004 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II)77. This amendment has always been 
justified as merely “narrative” and for clarification purposes78. The 
Council of the European Union, finally, took the opportunity to recast 
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, in order to introduce, formally, the same 
                                                 
74 See Proposal for a Council Regulation creating a European enforcement order for 
uncontested claims (COM(2002) 159 final — 2002/0090(CNS)) OJ C 203E, 27/08/ 2002. 
75 Common Position (EC) No. 19/2004 of 6 February 2004 adopted by the Council, 
acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, with a view to adopting a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council creating a European enforcement order for 
uncontested claims, OJ C 079 E , 30/03/2004, 59. 
76 COM (2004)90 final, Brussels, 9.2.2004, 2202/0090 (COD), 8, 3.3.2.  
77 OJ L 199 of 31 July 2007. 
78 Regarding the “Rome II” Regulation, the Common Position of the Council, of 25 
September 2006, OJ C 289E 28/11/ 2006 states that “In comparison with the original 
Commission proposal, the scope of the instrument has been clarified and further 
elaborated. Civil and commercial matters do not cover liability of the State for acts or 
omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta jure imperii)”. The adopted Regulation 
clarifies in recital (7) that “The material scope and the provisions of this Regulation 
should be consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters ("Brussels I") and the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations “; Recital (9) states that “Claims arising out of "acta jure imperii" should 
include claims against officials who act on behalf of the State and liability for acts of 
public authorities, including liability of publicly appointed office-holders. Therefore, 
these matters should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation”.  
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amendment in the text of its Article 1 (1) of the recent July 2012 “recast 
proposal of the Brussels I Regulation”79.  
Far from being simply “narrative”, or “innocent”, as the European 
legislators pretend, this amendment to the Brussels Convention/ Brussels 
I Regulation’s scope ratione materiae, introduced during the drafting of the 
Regulation on the enforcement order, is the result of a specific request 
advanced by the German delegation during the legislative work in the 
European Council, exactly in order to clarify that “titles on the liability of 
the Federal Republic of Germany for war crimes committed during World 
War II should not be certified as a European Enforcement Order”80. In 
order to understand the rationale of this request it is necessary to return to 
the situation described in the second paragraph of this study: precisely to 
the Greek judgment in Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, in 
which the Court of First Instance of Livadia (by means of a “default” 
judgment against Germany) held this State liable to pay compensation 
amounting to approximately $ 30 million to the relatives of the Greek 
victims (Distomo case)81. Following the Hellenic Supreme Court’s 
confirmation of the Greek Court of First Instance’s decision, this judgment 
became final. In 2003, pending the drafting of the European Enforcement 
Order Regulation, the Greek claimants brought proceedings against 
Germany before the German courts in order to enforce the judgment 
rendered by the Greek court of Livadia in Germany. We have already 
recalled that in 2003 the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH – Federal Court of Justice) 
declined to give effect to the Greek judgment in the Distomo case, on the 
ground that the Greek court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and 
that this judgment was contrary to the public order exception having been 
                                                 
79 The text has been proposed with a view to adoption as a “compromise package” of 
the draft general approach set out by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) at the 
meeting on 7 and 8 June 2012. See, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 10609/12, 
ADD 1, JUSTCIV 209 CODEC 1495, 1 June 2012, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast)- First reading- 
General approach. 
80 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 11813/03, JUSTCIV 122. CODEC 151. 
NOTE from German delegation: Proposal for a Council Regulation creating a European 
enforcement order for uncontested claims; COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
Brussels, 10660/03, JUSTCIV 92. CODEC 856, NOTE from German delegation. See also, 
Kropholler, Art. 2 EuVTVO, in EUROPÄISCHES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT, (Jan Kropholler 
ed., 8th ed., 2005, para. 2; Rauscher T. & Pabst S., Art. 2 EG-VollstrTitelVO, in 
EUROPÄISCHES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (Rauscher T. ed, 2nd ed., 2006) para. 5.¸ Gärtner 
V (2007), 439 (note 104). 
81 Supra, note 8. 
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given in breach of Germany’s entitlement to immunity82. If Regulation 
(EC) No. 805/04 had been in force in its initial version, without the 
additional exclusion of acta jure imperii from its scope ratione materiae, the 
BGH would been unable to deny exequatur to the Greek decision. As 
already mentioned, Germany did not appear before the Greek court; 
under the Regulation this would lead to an “uncontested” claim, allowing 
the claimants to apply for, and obtain, a European enforcement order in 
Greece, to be directly enforced in another Member State. The elimination 
of any intermediate measure (the exequatur procedure) in order to enforce 
this judgment abroad would have precluded the German courts from 
exercising any form of control over the foreign judgment, even in relation 
to the public order exception. Therefore, the best solution for Germany in 
order to avoid this result was to prevent the applicability ab initio of the 
Community/European instruments to the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign decisions ordering a State to pay compensation to the victims of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes83. Germany therefore succeeded 
in obtaining “political” support among EU Member States (the Council) in 
order to exclude civil claims for damages resulting from serious violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law from the substantive scope of 
application of this and other successor Community/European 
instruments. 
It is therefore difficult to support the ECJ’s view that the exclusion 
of the acta jure imperii from the scope of the Brussels Convention is 
justified by its intrinsic nature, being that this Convention’s (and its 
successor European Regulations’) instruments are simply aimed at 
enhancing the internal market by facilitating the mutual recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The argument 
that the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation are not “the right 
instruments” to govern compensation claims arising from “public” 
matters, like those arising from serious human rights violations84, has 
                                                 
82 Supra, note 28. 
83 Raquejo M., Transnational human rights claims against a State in the European Area 
of Freedom, Justice and Security, A view on ECJ Judgment, 15 February 2007- C 292/05 – 
Lechouritou and some recent Regulations, in The European Legal Forum, issue 5- 2007, I-
2009.  
84 In favour of the application of the Brussels Convention/Brussels Regulation (and 
the Lugano Convention) system to the so-called human rights claims, to be be heard by 
the Europaen courts on the basis of the compentence criterion set out in Article 5 (4), see 
Kessedjian C., Les actions civiles pour violation des droit de l’homme. Aspects de droit 
international privé, in Travaux du comité français de droit international privé, année 
2002-2004, Paris, 2005, 158 ff. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 38/2012 
10 dicembre 2012                                                                                                   ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of “civil matters” for the purpose of 
the application of the European international jurisdiction rules and the 
following (correlated) benefit of the free circulation of related judgments 
within the European area of “freedom and justice”. This conclusion simply 
derives from a political decision (solicited and obtained by Germany) to 
exclude governmental liability for serious violations of human rights from 
the scope of European secondary legislation in order to avoid that the 
victims’ right of compensation could be freely enforced throughout the 
European area of justice by means of Community/European Regulations. 
 
 
3 – The negative impact of the ICJ’s decision on the role of the 
national/international public order exception; critical assessment of the 
formalistic “procedure/substance” distinction with regard to criminal 
and civil proceedings 
 
Several consequences at the private international level could be drawn 
from the ICJ and ECJ judgments commented upon above. According to 
the latter, the decision on international jurisdiction for civil claims directed 
at compensation for damages resulting from the exercise of acts of 
government (amounting to crimes against humanity and/or war crimes) is 
remitted to the national private international law rules of the Member 
States. As these legal actions are not covered by the term “civil matters” 
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I 
Regulation, the national decisions on these civil claims would not benefit 
from the free recognition and enforcement system set out at the European 
level. Any State may reject their recognition and enforcement on the basis 
of the grounds for refusal available under national law, including the 
contrary public policy in the State addressed and the court of origin’s lack 
of jurisdiction. 
The door left open by the ECJ to the victims of serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law to bring actions for compensation 
before the national courts has nevertheless been closed by the ICJ’s 2012 
ruling, according to which - under the current state of development of 
customary international law - a State enjoys jurisdictional immunity from 
legal proceedings in the domestic courts of another State with respect to its 
acta jure imperii, even if these acts amount to international crimes. The 
Court stated that municipal judges have to decide on the question of 
immunity at the very outset of the proceedings, before any consideration 
of the merits of the case, and that immunity cannot be made dependent 
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upon the ground of the gravity of the acts alleged, nor upon the outcome 
of a “balancing exercise of the specific circumstances of each case to be 
conducted by the national court before which immunity is claimed”85. In 
sum, according to the ICJ, no exception to sovereign immunity exists for 
“human rights” civil cases.  
By rejecting the Italian “substantive normative hierarchy argument” 
as a possible justification for the Italian courts’ denial of immunity to 
Germany, the ICJ’s ruling also condemned the private international law 
reasoning concerning the “public order exception” followed by the Italian 
judges who declared the Greek judgment against Germany to be 
enforceable in Italy. The Italian judges found the Greek decision and the 
principles informing the national public order to be “perfectly in tune”: 
the solution given by the Areios Pagos to the jurisdictional immunity 
invoked by Germany was “in sync”, not only with the development of 
immunity law at the international level, but also with the absolute 
primacy that international jus cogens rules enjoyed in the Italian legal 
order. Rules such as the non-derogable norms protecting prisoners of war 
and those related to crimes against humanity, simply “assumed” by ICJ to 
be rules of jus cogens,86 have been considered by the Italian judges as an 
integral part of a “new international/European public order notion”, 
whose function consists precisely of protecting fundamental values of the 
international community. Fundamental values which correspond, 
furthermore, to Constitutional provisions imposed on the Italian judges by 
their national system (Article 10, first paragraph, and Article 11 of the 
Italian Constitution). In reaching this conclusion, the Italian Court of 
Cassation relied upon the same principle established in its 2004 Ferrini 
decision: that international immunity law has to be interpreted and 
applied by national judges consistently with the fundamental values 
shared by the international community and embodied in the national 
public policy exception87. 
                                                 
85 Judgment, para. 105. 
86 Judgment, para. 94. 
87 Court of Cassation, sez. 1, 20 May 2011, n. 11163 (supra note 15). The “substantive” 
inconsistency found by the Italian court in the internal legal system, in that case as well as 
in all the others brought before it, concerned competing international values and 
principles: on the one hand, the paramount values of human rights and human dignity 
endorsed by jus cogens norms and by constitutional principles and, on the other, the 
recognition of the immunity of States which bars the exercise of jurisdiction in civil claims 
against the State whose armed forces have committed grave breaches of obligations 
arising under peremptory norms of general international law. See the Italian 
Countermemorial, para. 4.67. 
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The function and role of the general public policy exception 
consists, exactly, of ensuring the coherence and the harmony of the 
internal legal system, in the light not only of the “domestic” values and 
public interests of the forum State, but also of principles and international 
values, specifically those established in “imperative” or “mandatory” 
rules of international law88. The Italian judges therefore correctly 
identified (at the time of the proceedings in question) the principles and 
fundamental values of the forum State. Secondly, due to the fact that 
international jus cogens rules enter into the national legal system in 
accordance with an “inherent logic of a normative hierarchy of norms”, 
the Italian court drew at that time the logical consequence of their existence 
and status (hierarchically higher than any other rule of international law) 
in the proceedings brought before them: they decided that these rules 
must prevail over the non-peremptory rule of State immunity, when 
immunity is invoked by the responsible State in order to avoid its 
responsibility and to deny to individuals any forms of reparation and 
compensation. They reached the same conclusion when faced with an 
application for exequatur of a foreign judgment against a third State: in 
order to reaffirm the principle that a State cannot invoke hierarchically 
lower rules (those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the 
illegality of its actions, the Italian judges used the public policy exception 
in a “positive” way; not as a barrier for precluding the recognition and 
enforcement of the foreign judgment in the forum State, but exactly for the 
opposite reason: as a means to reaffirm - at the national and international 
level - the effectiveness of these norms, which reflect principles which are 
widely accepted as fundamental in all the legal systems throughout the 
world, whose respect for, and compliance with, the national judges are 
under a duty (obligation) to guarantee. By declaring the enforceability of the 
Greek judgment in the forum, the Italian judges also used private 
international law to comply with the double international obligation 
imposed on States (and judges) by the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
                                                 
88 Sperduti S., Ordine pubblico internazionale e ordine pubblico interno, RDI (1954), 
82 ff.; Barile, Ordine pubblico (dir. int. priv.), Enciclopedia del diritto, Milan, 1980, vol. 30; 
Benvenuti P., Comunità statale, comunità internazionale e ordine pubblico 
internazionale, Milan, 1977; Lattanzi F., Valore assoluto o relativo dei principi di ordine 
pubblico, RDI, 1974, 281 ff.; Verhoeven J., Droit des traits, reserve et ordre public (jus 
cogens), JT, 1994, 134 ff.; Boschiero N., Ordine pubblico “internazionale” e norme di 
applicazione necessaria, in Atti Notarili nel Diritto Comunitario e Internazionale - Vol. II: 
Diritto Internazionale Privato, a cura di Preite F., Turin, 2011, 139 ff., 154 ff. 
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(Art. 41.2): not to recognize as lawful a situation which has arisen under 
serious violations of a peremptory norm of general international law and 
not to render assistance or aid in maintaining such a situation.  
As already recalled, the ICJ rejected the argument that the non-
peremptory rule of the jurisdictional immunity of a State should be lifted 
if not doing so would hinder the enforcement of jus cogens rules, even in 
the absence of a direct conflict between the two sets of rules; the Court also 
stated that extending jurisdictional immunity to a State in breach of 
international obligations arising under jus cogens rules does not amount to 
recognizing such situations as being lawful or to render assistance and aid 
in maintaining it89. The ICJ’s ruling, according to which any interpretation 
of the international legal system which is consistent with the hierarchy of 
norms is inadmissible with regard to the immunity of the State, will from 
now on prevent national courts from guaranteeing the supremacy of 
fundamental human rights and human dignity in their forum, either 
directly by affirming their jurisdiction in proceedings arising out of 
compensation against third States in respect of acta jure imperii 
(notwithstanding their unlawful nature), or indirectly via the operation of 
the public policy exception mechanism (whatever its use, positive or 
negative). As to the public policy exception, while it cannot be inferred 
from the ICJ’s judgment that the fundamental values enshrined in 
international jus cogens rules should no longer be considered part of the 
national/international public policy notion of each State, the ICJ’s 
judgment will nevertheless have a substantive freezing effect on its 
operation in the future. The Court’s distinction between questions of 
substance and procedure, and its finding that the substantive nature of jus 
cogens rules has no impact on the procedural question of State immunity 
implies an international obligation for States (and their judiciary) to 
guarantee jurisdictional immunity to the foreign State whenever they are 
faced with a problem of State immunity for acta jure imperii, even if 
committed in violation of international jus cogens rules. Municipal judges 
will always be prevented from hearing these cases brought before them as 
to their merits, with the consequence that the forum’s public policy 
exception could never come into question. This compression of the public 
policy exception at the private international law level is not at all to be 
welcomed, as this is the notion that had most contributed to linking the 
                                                 
89 Judgment, paras. 93, 95; see Costelloe D., New Developments on Peremptory Norms 
of General International Law – The ICJ’s Judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State, in CJICL Blog, 2 April 2012. 
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private and public international law reasoning and to develop (at the level 
of the national legal system) the principles enshrined in international law, 
with specific regard to human rights international provisions and 
obligations.  
Besides that, the ICJ’s strict and formalist argument concerning the 
procedure/substance distinction between State immunity rules 
(procedural) and jus cogens (substantive), is not at all convincing. In 
domestic legal systems this distinction, as correctly recalled in the 
doctrine, has long been criticized by recognizing that procedural rules 
“may go to the heart of substantive justice”, in facilitating or denying a 
remedy to the claimants.90 At the international level, the “artificial” 
distinction between substantive and procedural law had already been 
condemned, with convincing arguments, in relation to criminal 
proceedings for serious violations of international peremptory norms, 
namely the prohibition of torture. In the Pinochet case, for example, the 
House of Lords had concluded (in relation to the 1984 Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment) that the “substantive” prohibition of torture (a jus cogens 
rule) has the overriding force to deprive the rules of sovereign immunity 
of their legal effects, thus entailing clear “procedural” consequences for 
the doctrine of State immunity91. In its 2012 decision the ICJ did not 
consider the Pinochet judgment to be “relevant”, as it concerned the 
immunity of a former Head of State from criminal prosecution in another 
State and not the immunity of the State itself, and also because the 
rationale of this judgment was based on the specific languages of the 
Torture convention. While it is true that a number a States do not consider 
the Torture convention to establish universal civil jurisdiction, contrary to 
the opposite opinion expressed by the Committee against torture92, the 
mere idea of universal jurisdiction in criminal and/or civil proceedings 
suggests, as correctly underlined in the doctrine, that “the substance of 
certain norms has procedural implications” and that the two issues could 
not be considered “unconnected as a matter of principle”93. The ICJ’s 
conclusion in its Germany v. Italy judgment, that there is no “inherent” link 
between rules of jus cogens and rules on State immunity, simply ignores 
                                                 
90 Trapp K. N., Mills A., CJICL (2012), 160. 
91 Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (2000) 1 AC 147, at 203 ff. per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. 
92 Conclusions and Reccomendations, 34th Session, 2-20 May 2005, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 7 July 2005, paras 4 (g), 5 (f).  
93 Trapp K. N., Mills A., CJICL (2012), 161. 
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the interplay that ought to exist between these hierarchically higher norms 
and any other rule which does not have the same status (like the rules on 
State immunity) by “preconceiving” (for the purpose of its reasoning) the 
scope of the former rules as “substantive”.  
In doing so, the Court artificially separated the imperative precepts 
of jus cogens from their possible implementation and effectiveness, thus 
attributing to the jus cogens rules very limited legal effects. Furthermore, 
the ICJ did not provide any convincing explanation with regard to the 
distinction to be made between criminal and civil proceedings, thus 
relying on the same unconvincing and unexplained conclusions reached 
by a very strict majority of judges (9 votes to 8) in the well known case of 
Al-Aldsani v. the United Kingdom decided by the European Court of Human 
Rights94. This Court (the Grand Chamber), while accepting the prohibition 
of torture as a norm of jus cogens in international law, nevertheless found 
itself unable “to discern … any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter 
of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in 
the court of another State where acts of torture are alleged”. The same 
unfortunate principle was reiterated by the European Court in the 
following year, in Kalogeropoulus and others v. Greece and Germany95; in 
rejecting an application relating to the refusal of the Greek Government 
and the German courts to enforce the Distomo judgment, the Court said 
that it was not established “that there is yet acceptance in international 
law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of 
civil claims for damages brought against them in another State for crimes 
against humanity”. In their joint dissenting opinion on the Al-Aldsani 
judgment, judges Rozakis, Caflisch, Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barrate and 
Vajic objected to the main reasoning of the majority of the Court – that the 
standards applicable in civil cases differ from those applying in criminal 
matters when a conflict arises between a peremptory rule – as it was given 
“in the absence of authority”; they also found it to be defective on two 
other grounds: firstly, because the English courts, which dismissed the 
merits of a claim brought by the applicant against the State of Kuwait for 
an allegation of torture, never resorted to such a distinction in so far as the 
legal force of the rule on State immunity or the applicability of the 1978 
Act to the claim; they simply denied the jus cogens status of the rule 
prohibiting torture. Secondly, because this distinction “is not consonant 
                                                 
94 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom [GC], Application No. 35763/97, supra note 53. 
95 Application No. 59021/00, Decision of 12 December 2002, ECHR Reports 2002-X, 417; 
ILR, Vol. 129, 537. 
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with the very essence of the operation of the jus cogens rules”. The 
dissenting judges went directly to the heart of the matter considered by 
the Court, stating that  
 
“it is not the nature of the proceedings which determines the effects 
that a jus cogens rule has upon another rule of international law, but 
the character of the rule as peremptory norm and its interaction with 
a hierarchically lower rule”.  
 
The dissenting judges therefore concluded that the distinction between 
“the criminal or civil nature of the domestic proceedings is immaterial”, as 
what really matters is the violation of a jus cogens rule96. Similarly, Judge 
Loucaides correctly pointed out, in his dissenting opinion, that the 
“rationale” behind the principle of international law that those responsible 
for violations of jus cogens rules must be accountable “is not based only 
on the objective of criminal law. It is equally valid in relation to any legal 
liability whatsoever”. A conclusion which must be considered to be valid 
not only in relation to the functional immunity of State officials but also in 
respect of the immunity of the State itself. The ICJ, in its 2012 judgment, 
never explained the different rationale behind the distinction between 
criminal and civil proceedings, nor did it take the opportunity to explain 
why developments in the criminal context should be ignored in the 
context of civil proceedings, taking into due consideration that both form 
part of State immunity and serve the same purpose: “to hold those 
responsible for crimes under international law accountable and to give the 
victims access to justice and reparation”97. 
At the private international law level, the link between substance 
and procedure is enshrined in the forum necessitatis “autonomous” ground 
of jurisdiction, currently available in ten Member States of the European 
Union when an appropriate forum abroad is lacking for the plaintiff. As is 
correctly underlined in an important Study commissioned by the 
European Commission on the issue of national rules of jurisdiction for 
cases where the current European law does not provide uniform grounds 
of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, like actions against 
defendants domiciled in third States (the so-called “residual 
jurisdiction”)98, this jurisdiction “of necessity” is traditionally considered 
to be based on, or even imposed by, the right to a fair trial under Article 6 
                                                 
96 Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 4. 
97 Zgonec-Rozej (2012), 3.  
98 Study on Residual Jurisdiction, General Report, 3rd Version, 6 July 2007, prepared 
by NUYTS A., and al., 64 ff.  
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(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In some countries (like 
France), this ground of jurisdiction is also referred to as the general 
principle of public international law which prohibits the “denial of 
justice”, as it would ensure effective access to justice when there is no 
other forum available. Even if not presented in this form, it must be 
emphasized that the proceedings in the Italian courts, setting aside 
Germany’s immunity, had been mainly justified by the necessity to avoid 
an otherwise inescapable “denial of justice”. Italy contended that the 
Italian courts were justified in asserting jurisdiction against Germany 
because all other attempts to secure compensation for the various groups 
of victims involved in the Italian and Greek proceedings had failed, and 
had the Italian judges decided to accord Germany the immunity to which 
it would otherwise have been entitled, no other avenues would have been 
available to the victims; with the consequence that a denial of justice 
would have been endorsed by the Italian judiciary. The so-called “last 
resort” argument advanced by Italy entailed, therefore, two fundamental 
aspects, both substantially ignored by the (too abstract and formalist) ICJ 
judgment: first, the public and private international law right of the 
victims to have access, as a measure of last resort, to a court (particularly 
to the courts of the State when serious violations of jus cogens rules have 
been committed, which in the case in question were also the courts of their 
nationality) when all other avenues have been explored and all prospects 
of obtaining reparation in other ways have already been exhausted; 
second: the substantive and inherent link between the procedure and 
substance of this asserted forum “of necessity”: denying the victims’ 
“procedural” right of access to the courts (by according jurisdictional 
immunity to the responsible State - a rule also of a procedural character), 
would have meant a denial of their “substantive” right to compensation. 
The ICJ has not been unaware that, at least, an entire category of Italian 
victims had been denied compensation on the ground that they have been 
excluded by Germany from the status of prisoner of war that they were 
entitled to, and therefore denied access to the Inter-State compensation 
scheme (para. 99). While considering this as a “matter of surprise and 
regret”, the Court nevertheless refused to assess the impact of this failure 
to make reparations, as well as the absence of alternative means of redress, 
on the “legality” of the Italian decisions in this specific circumstance. It 
confined itself to recognizing that “immunity from jurisdiction of 
Germany in accordance with international law may preclude judicial 
redress for the Italian nationals concerned”, and that these claims “could 
be the subject of further negotiations involving the two States concerned, 
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with a view to resolving the issue”99. It is worth remembering, in this 
respect, that the Italian effort to have an ICJ decision on the question of 
reparation owed to the Italian victims has been unsuccessful, as the court 
dismissed the counterclaim in which Italy asked the Court to adjudicate 
and declare Germany responsible for its ongoing failure to comply with its 
reparation obligation towards the Italian war crimes victims, on the 
ground that it did not fall within its jurisdiction, and was therefore 
inadmissible under Article 80(1) of the Rules of the Court. The Court 
thought that it was also unnecessary to rule on whether, as Italy 
contended, international law confers upon the individual victim of a 
violation of the law of armed conflict “a directly enforceable right to claim 
compensation”100. The only rule of the ICJ on the right of reparation, and 
the corresponding duty to make reparation, is that there is not a jus cogens 
rule under international law “requiring the payment of full compensation 
to each and every individual victim”101. 
 
 
3.1 – The consequences for the fundamental individual right to have 
access to justice and the right to an effective remedy 
 
What are the consequences of the ICJ’s decision for the fundamental 
(private as well as public international law) individual’s right to have 
access to justice? As correctly recognized by Judge Cançado Trindade in 
his dissenting opinion, the two Parties understood this human right in 
fundamentally different ways102: Germany construed this right very 
narrowly and argued its limitation with regard to accessing the judicial 
system of the forum State without discrimination and with full procedural 
rights. Germany further distinguished the right to have access to justice 
(and its complementary component, namely the right to an effective 
remedy) from the question whether the plaintiff has a genuine, 
substantive, legal claim. Consequently, it argued that the right to have 
access to justice had been respected in relation to both the Italian and 
Greek victims, who had full access to judicial remedies under German 
law; the decisions of the German courts which rejected reparations were 
not a denial of justice but simply the recognition that these victims did not 
have the rights which they claimed. For its part, Italy argued that the right 
                                                 
99 Judgment, para. 104. 
100 Judgment, para. 108. 
101 Judgment, para. 94.  
102 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, paras. 73-79. 
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of access to justice “is conceived in all systems of human rights of 
protection as a necessary complement of the rights substantively granted”, 
and that not surprisingly it had been qualified by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (in the case Goiburu and others v. Paraguay of 22.09. 
2006) “as a peremptory norm of international law in a case in which the 
substantive rights violated were also granted by jus cogens”103. The same 
conclusion on the peremptory status of this norm has been reached by 
Judge Antonio Cassese, the President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
in an Order assigning matters to a pre-trial Judge, issued on 15 April 2010, 
after a lengthy and learned assessment of the status of this right in 
international customary law (including in international tribunal 
judgments and in domestic legal systems)104. 
Unlike the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European 
Court of Human Rights has refused, starting from its unfortunate Al-
Adsani judgment, to bring the right of access to justice within the domain 
of jus cogens, and has rather approached this fundamental right from the 
side of its permissible or implicit “limitations”. Not only can this right be 
temporarily suspended but, in addition, it can be restricted when 
restrictions are imperatively justified by the need, among other things, to 
respect personal or functional immunities accorded to the person or to the 
State against whom or which a claim is lodged. It was on this premise that 
this Court decided, on 12 December 2002, to reject the claims of 257 
applicants against Germany and Greece who claimed that the refusal to 
enforce the Areios Pagos decision on the Distomo massacre constituted an 
undue infringement of their right to have access to justice, as laid down in 
Art. 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and their right to 
property as established by Art. 1 of the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention. The Court found the applicants’ claim to be manifestly ill-
founded, as the restriction of their right to have access to justice was 
justified in so far as it pursued the legitimate aim “of complying with 
international law to promote comity and good relations between States”. 
Regarding the “proportionality” of the restriction, the Court interpreted 
Art. 6 in the light of the relevant norms of the international law on State 
immunity; referring to its own Al-Adsani judgment, the Court concluded 
that the restrictions on access generally accepted by the community of 
nations as part of the doctrine of State immunity could not be regarded as 
“disproportionate”. It dismissed the claim based on Art. 1 of the 
                                                 
103 ICJ, italian Countermemorial, para. 4.94. 
104 Case No. CH/PRES/2010/01, para. 29. 
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Additional Protocol on the same reasoning105. On 31 May 2011, the Court, 
by means of a “décision sur la recevabilité”, dismissed the claim of the 
Greek plaintiffs (Sfountouris et autre) that the German courts’ refusal to pay 
compensation to the victims of the Distomo massacre106 constituted an 
infringement of their rights as established by a combination of Art. 1 of the 
Additional Protocol and Art. 14 of the European Convention. The Court, 
after having analyzed the various German decisions, concluded that  
 
“compte tenu de tous les elements devant elle, … l’on ne saurait 
soutenir que l’application et l’interprétation du droit international et 
interne auxquelles ont procédé les jurisdictions allemands aient été 
entachées de considerations déraisonnables ou arbitraries”.  
 
The Court reasoned that  
 
”les requérants ne peuvent prétendre avoir une espérance légitime de 
se voir accorder une indeminisation pour le préjudice subi et que les 
faits litigieux ne tombent dès lors pas sous l’empire du Protocole n.1. 
Partant, l’article 14 de la convention ne trove pas non plus à 
s’appliquer”107. 
 
It is not our task to take a position on the question of whether or not 
the right to justice has already been elevated to the level of jus cogens, and 
also not on the correctness of the doctrinal affirmation that a procedural jus 
cogens rule is necessarily contained in a material jus cogens rule; in other 
words, that every jus cogens rule contains or presupposes a procedural rule 
which guarantees its judicial enforcement108. Nevertheless, it seems 
difficult to construct the right to have access to justice as a peremptory 
rule of customary international law, from which the international 
community, States and other international legal subjects may not derogate, 
where it is widely recognized that this right is not “absolute”, as 
repeatedly held by the European Court of Human Rights; many 
derogations are allowed by the norm itself109. In any case, it is worth 
remembering that all the restrictions allowed for these fundamental rights 
are not only limited in number, but also subject to stringent requirements: 
among other things (they must be reasonable and not disproportionate), 
the restrictions on its scope could not be applied so as to reduce the access 
                                                 
105 Kalogeropoulo decision, (note 90). 
106 See note 32. 
107 Application No. 24120706, Decision of 31 May 2011. 
108 Bartsch K., Elberling B., (2003), 486 ff.  
109 Stegarescu and Bahrin v. Portugal, no. 46194/06, 6 April 2010, para. 46. 
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left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very 
essence of the right is impaired. It is not therefore necessary to 
characterize this rule as belonging to jus cogens in order to draw the logical 
consequence deriving from the ICJ’s decision to refuse to exercise the 
necessary and inherent (in its judicial task) balancing of possible 
conflicting rights and legal interests brought before it: the ICJ’s conclusion 
that national courts, when faced with a problem of State immunity for acta 
jure imperii, even if committed in violation of international jus cogens 
obligations, must be prevented from hearing the case, implies a real denial 
of the very essence of the right to have access to justice. The right to go 
before an independent and impartial judge and to have one’s claims duly 
considered by such a judge has nothing to do (of course) with the 
complementary right to an effective remedy; the existence of the 
fundamental right of access to justice does not automatically entitle 
individuals to obtain a “substantive” judicial remedy110. The national 
courts, like the German courts did in respect of the Italian and Greek 
plaintiffs, could obviously conclude, after considering the merits of the 
cases brought before them, that the claimants did not have “genuine” 
substantive rights to make a claim. In order to reject the Italian argument 
that the right of access to justice entails an obligation to satisfy the 
complaining party, being directly linked to Germany’s ongoing failure to 
comply with its reparation obligations, the ICJ came to the worst possible 
conclusion (according to public and private international law): it simply 
denied all the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity their 
fundamental “preliminary” right to have access to a court, and therefore, 
to justice. The Court denied them the very right to resort to the courts, a 
constituent element of the well known public and private international 
law right to a fair trial. One may legitimately wonder whether such a form 
of “blanked” immunity applied by the ICJ, as well as by the European 
Court of Human Rights, in order to block completely any judicial 
determination of civil rights, without balancing the competing interests 
and the nature of the specific claims, amount to a real violation (being a 
disproportionate limitation) of the right enshrined in the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights [Articles 6(1) and 13],111 in the 1969 
American Convention on Human Rights (Article 25), and in the 1981 
African Charter on Human and People Rights [Article 7(1)], as well as in 
                                                 
110 Judge Antonio Cassese, Case No. CH/PRES/2010/01, para. 36. 
111 See the Dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides in the Al-Adsani Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice.  
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Art. 6 of the Treaty of the European Union. As Ms Rosalyn Higgins had 
observed  
 
«it is severing immunity which is the exception to jurisdiction and 
not jurisdiction which is the exception to the basic rule of immunity. 
An exception to the normal rules of jurisdiction should only be 
granted when international law requires – that is to say, when it is 
consonant with justice and with the equitable protection of the parties. It is 
not granted “as of right”»112. 
 
 
4 – Conclusion 
 
The ICJ’s rejection of all the private international law reasoning followed 
by the various national courts confronted with the issue of the 
jurisdictional immunity of a third State which is allegedly responsible for 
acta jure imperii in violation of international jus cogens rules had been 
dictated by the legal impossibility of pronouncing itself on the question of 
whether the Greek courts had (themselves) violated Germany’s immunity 
in the Distomo case. The ICJ’s reasoning that the exequatur proceeding is an 
“exercise of jurisdictional power” is certainly correct, but the weakness of 
the Court’s final pronouncement lies in the unconvincing and selective 
arguments that it used in order to determine that the Italian courts had 
breached Italy’s obligation to accord jurisdictional immunity to Germany 
in respect of the various claims brought before them by Italian claimants. 
Further, the ICJ approached the fundamental right to justice not with the 
due attention to its essence, but focusing (like the ECHR) on its “implicit” 
limitations. At the end of the day, the combined effect of the various 
decisions (rendered by the ICJ, ECHR, ECJ) closed any door to the victims 
of international crimes, not only in respect of the complementary right to 
an effective remedy for grave breaches of human rights and of 
humanitarian law, but also (and foremost) with regard to the very 
universally “recognised” fundamental principle of the “right to a court”. 
The consequence is a judicial codification of an undoubted denial of the 
procedural right to have access to justice113. By imposing the “preliminary” 
nature of State immunity from jurisdiction, and totally ignoring the 
                                                 
112 Higgins R., Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 Neth. 
Int’L. L. rev., 271 (1982), emphasis added.  
113 See Francioni F., Il diritto di accesso alla giustizia nel diritto internazionale 
generale, in Francioni, Gestri, Ronizitti, Scovazzi (eds.), Accesso alla giustizia 
dell’individuo nel diritto internazionale e dell’Unione Europea, 13 ff. 
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rationale under the Italian “last resort” argument, the ICJ’s decision will 
(from now on) preclude national courts from assessing the merits of the 
claims, the context in which these claims have been made, and also the 
balancing of the different factors underlying each case, irrespective of any 
forum “of necessity” due to the absence of any alternative forum available 
to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Court’s conclusion that immunity could 
not have any bearing on questions of substance, due to its fundamental 
formalist substance/procedure distinction, simply (and skilfully) avoided 
the core issue of the case: whether questions of substance should/could 
have any bearing on procedural hierarchically lower rules of State 
immunity. The ICJ’s decision also failed to explain why there should be 
any different rationale in relation at to the inherent link of substance and 
procedure between criminal and civil proceedings.  
Another negative side of the ICJ’s decision is its potential deterrent 
effect on the evolving State practice (discretionally) determining when 
third States may bar civil claims on the assertion of State immunity rules, 
taking into due consideration the need for “justice” in the light of the 
application of the general principles underlying human rights and 
humanitarian law. The ICJ’s 2012 judgement could have a “chilling” effect 
on national courts, preventing them from moving the international law of 
State immunity towards a more responsive direction to contemporary 
international law that demands a growing recognition of the rights of 
individuals vis-à-vis States114. One might, for example, seek to draw 
lessons from the ICJ’s judgment, beyond the context of war crimes claims, 
and declare that the “State sponsors of terrorism” exception in the U.S. 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which allows suits to proceed against 
“designated” States for certain acta jure imperii, is inconsistent with 
customary international law “as it presently stands”115. Further, 
notwithstanding the fact that the ICJ’s decision concerned sovereign 
immunity, and not the right of a sovereign to entertain civil claims for 
misconduct by “aliens” on foreign territories (with the consequence that 
the principle of universal jurisdiction was not at issue), the ICJ’s decision 
also could have an impact on this issue. Some (sad) examples can already 
be deduced from State practice and European legislation. The adverse 
effect of the ICJ’s judgment could be measured, for example, in the U.S 
human rights litigation in the U.S. courts: it is easy to measure the strength 
                                                 
114 Webb P., The International Court of Justice’s judgment in Germany v. Italy: A 
Chilling Effect?, March 17th, 2012, iLawyerblog.com.  
115 Keitner C. I., Germany v. Italy: The International Court of Justice Affirms Principles 
of State Immunity, an ASIL Insight, volume 16, issue 5, posted February 15, 2012.  
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of the ICJ’s implicit idea that any extraterritorial exercise of “prescriptive 
jurisdiction” (like the one practised by the U.S. courts according to the 
Alien Tort statute) would also violate international law as it currently 
stands, as a general prohibition of extraterritorial jurisdiction equally rests 
on the fundamental principles of sovereign equality116. This position has 
already being strongly argued by an amici curiae brief filed at the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the pending Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum case117, in 
which the Supreme Court has been confronted with the question of the 
liability of corporations under the federal common law that derives from 
the Alien Tort Statute in a dispute involving “unlawful” conduct in 
Nigeria by a Nigerian subsidiary of an Anglo-Dutch family of companies. 
What is interesting to note is that the U.S. Government initially supported, 
before the Unites States Supreme Court, the plaintiffs’ claim that there is 
no international law limitation on the availability of civil remedies for 
human rights violations arising in the territories of foreign sovereigns; the 
U.S government urged a reversal of the Second Circuit judgment arguing 
that “[c]ourts may recognize corporate liability in actions under the ATS 
as a matter of federal common law.” After the petitioners’ supplemental 
brief, the U.S Government changed its stance in June 2012 (hence after the 
ICJ’s February 2012 judgement). In its supplemental amicus brief, the U.S. 
Government stated that the Court should not “fashion a federal common-
law cause of action” on the facts of this case, where “Nigerian plaintiffs 
are suing Dutch and British corporations for allegedly aiding and abetting 
the Nigerian military and police forces in committing [crimes] in Nigeria.” 
It further argued that U.S. Courts should apply forum non conveniens and 
exhaustion doctrines at the very beginning of Alien Tort cases, in order to 
limit the filing of ATS cases in the U.S., where there is a slight nexus with 
the forum118. 
                                                 
116 Stephan P., on ICJ Decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v. Italy), 
filed February 5, 2012, under Lawfare Blog; Separate Opinion of Judge Keith in the ICJ’s 
2012 judgment.  
117 The text of the 2008 judgment is available on http://online.wsj.com/ public/resources/do 
cuments/091710atsruling.pdf. 
118 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in partial support of 
affirmance, No. 10-1941, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Kiobel-
US-supp-brief-6-13-12.pdf. The U.S. doctrine has read between the lines of this new writ of 
certiorari, explaining that “SG’s office and perhaps the Executive Branch generally saw 
the writing on the wall based on the Court’s oral argument and rebriefing order that ATS 
litigation was going to be shut down based on extraterritoriality – a position the Bush 
Administration had previously argued. Not wanting to go that far, the SG’s office tried to 
give the Court comfort that cases with no U.S. nexus would not be filed here and other 
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On the European side, another probable negative consequence of 
the ICJ’s judgment may be recalled: in June 2012 the Council of the 
European Union adopted a “general approach” with regard to the 
proposed recast of the Brussels I Regulation, its provisions and key recitals, 
and adopted as “a compromise package” a new draft of this Regulation119, 
completely different from the European Commission’s 2011 Proposal120. 
According to the new text, all the provisions for disputes involving third 
State defendants, suggested by the European Commission, have been 
deleted together with the new proposed European uniform rule of forum 
necessitatis. This European “political” decision has therefore annulled any 
hope to have, within the European space of justice and freedom, the 
operation of the Brussels I Regulation in the broader international order, 
providing grounds for the jurisdiction of the courts of Member States in 
disputes involving third-state defendants. The most significant innovation of 
the Commission’s proposal consisted precisely in having a new European 
head of jurisdiction (the forum necessitatis rule) able to ensure that the 
corporate social responsibility of firms with their headquarters or seat in 
the territory of a Member State may be held accountable for human rights 
violations by their subsidiaries in third – usually developing – countries, 
where they are not held to the same European high standards of human 
rights121. After the ICJ’s decision, the Council of the European Union has 
(better) decided not to extend the application of the Regulation to third 
State defendants/situations, thus avoiding any potential accusation of the 
extraterritoriality of European secondary legislation, and consequently also 
renouncing a specific jurisdictional ground for denouncing, before the 
European courts, foreign corporations allegedly responsible for serious 
human rights violations committed abroad.  
Another closed door to the victims’ enjoyment of their rights came 
again from the European side: in 2011 the Tribunale ordinario di Brescia 
(Italy) submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling to the highest court 
in the European Union, the ECJ, in the course of proceedings between a 
                                                                                                                                     
doctrines like forum non conveniens and exhaustion would keep those cases out of U.S. 
courts.” See, TREY CHILDRESS, Kiobel–The Plot Thickens, Conflict of Laws.net, June 14, 2012. 
119 Document 10609/12 JUSTCIV 209 CODEC 1495 ADD 1, 1 June 2012. 
120 On the Commission’s 2011 Proposal see Boschiero N., Il funzionamento del 
regolamento Bruxelles I nell’ordinamento internazionale: note sulle modifiche contenute nella 
proposta di rifusione del 2011, in Diritto del commercio internazionale, 2012, pp. 253-302. 
121 MUIR WATT H., The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Recast), European Parliament- Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies, 2011, 15.  
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number of Italian nationals and the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal 
Republic of Germany) concerning their application for compensation in 
respect of the harm which they suffered by reason of their deportation, or 
the deportation of the persons to whom they are the legal successors, 
during the Second World War. The request for preliminary ruling 
concerned the issue of the objection of immunity in relation to European 
Union law, namely the Treaty of Lisbon and the the 2000 Charter on 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union ( the Charter)122. The Italian 
Tribunal asked the ECJ to pronounce itself on the compatibility of 
Germany’s alleged “civil” State immunity before the Italian courts with 
Art. 6 (TUE) and Articles 17, 47, 52 of the Charter. It further requested the 
European Court to pronounce itself on the compatibility of Germany’s 
alleged “civil” State immunity decisions to exclude some European 
citizens (the victims of war crimes) from the benefits of reparations with 
the TUE’s rules and the European general principle of “non conceditur 
contra venire factum proprio”. Finally, the Italian Tribunal asked the ECJ to 
rule on the compatibility of Germany’s jurisdictional immunity with 
Articles 4 §3 and 21 TUE: according to the referring court, the rule on State 
immunity could exclude the summoned party’s civil liability as 
established by the common European principles common to the law of the 
Member States (Art. 340 TFUE) for violations of public international law in 
respect of citizens of another Member State. By an Order of 12 July 2012, 
the Third Chamber of the Court rejected this reference for a preliminary 
ruling by stating that “It is clear that the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the request for a 
preliminary ruling submitted by the Tribunale ordinario di Brescia 
(Italy)123. 
The Court recalled that, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, it can 
interpret European Union law only within the limits of the powers 
conferred on it, and that consequently it has no jurisdiction to give a 
ruling on the interpretation of provisions of international law which bind 
Member States outside the framework of European Union law. According 
to the Court of Justice, it has no jurisdiction ratione materiæ to rule not only 
on the interpretation of the general principle of international law relating 
to State immunity and on the interpretation of the Agreement on German 
External Debts, to which the European Union is not a party. Even if, 
admittedly, the European Court of Justice must apply international law 
                                                 
122 Gennaro Currà and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-466/11. 
123 Gennaro Currà and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Official Journal of the 
European Union, 6.10.2012  C 303/5. 
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(and may be required to interpret certain rules falling within the scope of 
that law), this could happen ( the Court recalls) solely within the context 
of the competence which has been conferred on the European Union by 
the Member States. According to the Court, the subject-matter of the case 
in the main proceedings is excluded from the scope of European Union 
law, as well as, therefore, the interpretation and application of the 
principle of international law on the State immunity. In addition the Court 
declared that it has no jurisdiction ratione temporis due to the fact that the 
dispute in the main proceedings concerned an application for 
compensation brought by citizens of a Member State against another 
Member State in respect of events which took place during the Second 
World War, and thus before the European Communities were established. 
The Court noted in this respect that the International Court of Justice 
declared that it had jurisdiction and delivered a judgment on the merits of 
the case on 3 February 2012 (Germany v. Italy). 
By stating that it’s impossible to determine whether the law and the 
conduct of two Member States are in compliance with the provisions of 
the EU and FEU Treaties and of the Charter provisions when the 
compatibility concerns an act or an event predating their entry into force, 
and by stating that the Court is called upon to interpret, in the light of the 
Charter, the law of the European Union within the limits of the powers 
conferred on it, the ECJ rendered a “perfect” judgment from a pure legalist 
point. Undoubtedly, since the situation in the main proceedings does not 
come within the scope of European Union law, it is logic for the Court to 
conclude, therefore, that it does not have jurisdiction and that the 
provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, in themselves, form the basis 
for any new power. Coming to the substance of the judgement, the 
European Court of Justice missed a real opportunity to better balance the 
necessity of granting immunity with the “right to have access to the 
courts” and the right to an effective remedy in the context of 
contemporary international law and European public and private 
international law, which undoubtedly demands that human rights must 
be taken more seriously, specifically with regard to respect for “due 
process” solemnly proclaimed in Article 47 of the EU Charter and 
guaranteed by the European public order exception124. 
                                                 
124 Salerno F., Competenza giurisdizionale, riconoscimento delle decisioni e diritto al 
giusto processo nella prospettiva europea, RDIPP (2011), 895-938; Fawcett J.J, The Impact 
of Article 6(1) of the Echr on Private International Law, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 56, 1-48. 
